The concept of ’causal crypticity’ was introduced by Richardson (2021) to describe the DOHaD field’s high tolerance for both causes and effects that are challenging to observe in nature, show small effect sizes, and are unstable across study populations and contexts. Causal crypticity can be understood in three ways: as an epistemic norm; as a boundary-delimiting signature of field culture or epistemic style; and as a promissory mode. Increasingly, causal crypticity characterises many fields of the big data-rich, postgenomic life sciences, making DOHaD science a useful index case for scholars of the history, philosophy, and social studies of science interested in the epistemic terrain and social implications of postgenomic sciences. The chapter concludes with a discussion of ethical and accountable claimsmaking in DOHaD science under conditions of causal crypticity.

The environment represents a central research object in the Developmental Origins of Health and Disease (DOHaD) and related fields such as epigenetics. This chapter discusses how DOHaD researchers operationalise and measure environments in and through their research practices to produce knowledge on how environmental experiences relate to health outcomes over the lifecourse. While DOHaD researchers discursively acknowledge the complexity of lived environments, we identify some of the current challenges to put this complexity into research practice, often resulting in reductionist accounts of the dynamic nature of human experiences. By proposing the term ’doing environments,’ we emphasise how practices to enact environments for scientific inquiry are products of decisions and negotiation processes that need careful consideration on what social and political consequences these ’doings’ might have and for whom. To that end, we aim to lay the ground for interdisciplinary conversations to engage in critical reflections about the social and political dimensions of doing environments in DOHaD research.

This chapter looks at the legal consequences of the demise of the molecular gene within science with the rise of postgenomics in the later part of the twentieth century. It also looks at the apparent dematerialisation of subject matter that occurred as a result of the Myriad decision, when biological subject matter came to be seen in terms of instructions or information rather than as a material chemical compound. It ends by showing that despite this apparent dematerialisation that materiality has continued to play an important role in the way that patent law interacts with biological subject matter.