In this chapter and the next, I describe and analyze critical analyses of power and domination, starting in the late 1950s with the power research of Floyd Hunter and C. Wright Mills. After these efforts, the problem of social order could no longer be plausibly addressed by reference to community, consensus, or consent to authority. Instead, social order came to look like a structural or systemic effect of power or domination.

This chapter aims to show with empirical evidence the veto power of business over corporate accountability.It starts discussing the underlying assumption that business veto power stems from its economic power, leading to a history of impunity. Although our judicial action data set seems to confirm patterns of impunity, it also indicates more variation than glib assumptions about economic actors’ power sustain. We explore what type of firm has proved more successful in vetoing judicial accountability, where that veto power over accountability occurs and when economic actors are most likely to successfully use their veto power over accountability. In the second part of the chapter, we explore the strategies economic actors have employed to maintain impunity, specifically legal, non-judicial, unlawful, and mobilizational. The third part of the chapter probes the notion of weakening economic actors’ veto power using our Archimedes’ Lever approach. To lift the weight of corporate accountability, either civil society actors must apply more force or the force of veto powers must be reduced. This section explores that possibility. The concluding section returns to Archimedes’ Lever to summarize the possibilities for change and what steps might contribute to reducing the power of veto players weighing down corporate accountability.