This chapter turns to an examination of choice and its hylomorphic structure. To spell out this structure, it further investigates the formal-causal dependence relation between volition and judgment already considered in Chapter 4. It argues that Aquinas draws a distinction between two types of forms, a form extrinsic to the volition, which is the preceding practical judgment, and a form intrinsic to volition, which is the intentional structure that volition inherits from the preceding judgment. It furthermore suggests that the intentional structure of volition involves two components analogous to those present in judgment. There is an attitudinal component analogous to assent in judgment, which Aquinas refers to as “adherence,” and there is also a content adhered to, namely, a means as related to an end. The final section applies this general picture to choice to explain its hylomorphic structure. It argues that choice is a volition whose intrinsic form consists of an attitude of preferential adherence attaching to one means rather than another, where this form is an intentional structure derived from the previous judgment of choice.

This chapter is the first of four investigating Aquinas’s view that choice is a hylomorphically structured act that inherits its preferential character from a previous judgment of reason. This chapter deals with the judgment preceding choice. The hallmark of this judgment is that it is free. It does not yet investigate this judgment’s free character in this chapter. Rather, here the groundwork is established for its discussion in Chapter 3 by clarifying what a practical judgment generally speaking is, for Aquinas. It argues that, on his view, a practical judgment involves two components, namely, a propositional content and an attitude of assent. It shows that the propositional content in question is an ought-statement or what Aquinas calls a “precept,” where the force of the ‘ought’ is not deontological, but rather means-end-relating. Thus, on Aquinas’s view, the chapter argues, to say that X ought to be done is to say that X ought to be pursued as a means for the sake of some end Y. It also shows that Aquinas draws a distinction between two types of means, expedient and necessary ones, and two types of ends, ultimate and non-ultimate ones, which yields four different types of precepts.