Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy promises an existential consolation that results from a philosophical insight. But what exactly does this consolation consist in and what is the insight that provides it? This chapter argues that Boethius’ philosophical consolation arises from an insight into the highest principle (principium) of practical knowledge: God conceived of as the highest good (summum bonum). For Boethius, the cognition of this principle also leads to an insight into a comprehensive cosmic order, ruled by God as the highest good, against the background of which even painful experiences, such as those of the first-person narrator of the Consolation, can be reassessed. Given that Boethius’ notion of consolation is embedded in the context of the Greco–Roman philosophical tradition, this chapter considers the metaphysical underpinnings of Boethius’ practical philosophy in light of his main philosophical predecessors: Plato, Aristotle, the Neoplatonists, and Augustine.

A cursory account of Maimon’s philosophical development, gleaned from his Autobiography, suggests a gradual emancipation from early Jewish influences toward a life-changing encounter with the thought of Immanuel Kant.However true in outline, this account does a disservice to the lasting influence of Maimonides upon all precincts of Maimon’s thought, and especially on his practical philosophy.In Maimon’s moral writings of the 1790’s, one finds a Maimonidean-inspired rationalism leading him to reject the Kantian “primacy of the practical” in favor of the superiority of intellectual perfection to moral perfection, a conclusion also in keeping with Spinoza, another important influence upon Maimon’s intellectual development. This rejection, in turn, leads Maimon to amend the theoretical foundations of Kantian practical philosophy by reconsidering the foundations of that philosophy; in Maimon’s words, “to show, in some deviation from Kant, that the morally good is good only because it is true.”Thus, while there is no doubt about Kant’s profound affect upon Maimon’s philosophical development, one cannot understand Maimon’s departures from Kant apart from the influence of Maimonides, which comes to light with special clarity in Maimon’s moral writings.

This article concentrates on manifestations of medieval political philosophy in the Rose. It focuses on two crucial themes for understanding the foundations of political and social life: the origins of political community, private property and other social institutions; and the relationship between love and justice, and the political relevance of these two concepts. The article first discusses Jean de Meun’s view concerning the origins of social institutions, and relates it to Ciceronian and Augustinian traditions, which had a deep influence on medieval political philosophy. The main focus of the article is on the relation between Jean’s political ideas and medieval understanding of Aristotle’s political philosophy and moral psychology. It is argued that the political role of love and justice cannot be understood without taking medieval Aristotelian philosophy seriously. Instead of trying to find historical and textual connections between individual medieval philosophers and Jean’s poem, the article embraces a different methodological approach: it aims to understand the philosophy behind the poem. This aim is achieved by reading relevant passages against medieval adaptations of Aristotle’s practical philosophy. The article thus charts possible connections between scholasticism and the Rose and aims to show that they should be understood against thirteenth-century Aristotelian philosophy.

The first part of the chapter surveys some of the main ways in which the Sorites Paradox has figured in arguments in practical philosophy in recent decades, with special attention to arguments where the paradox is used as a basis for criticism. Not coincidentally, the relevant arguments all involve the transitivity of value in some way. The second part of the chapter is more probative, focusing on two main themes. First, it further addresses the relationship between the Sorites Paradox and the main arguments discussed in the first part, by elucidating in what sense they rely on (something like) tolerance principles. Second, it briefly discusses the prospect of rejecting the respective principles, aiming to show that we can do so for some of the arguments but not for others. The reason is that in the latter cases the principles do not function as independent premises in the reasoning but, rather, follow from certain fundamental features of the relevant scenarios. It is also argued that not even adopting what is arguably the most radical way to block the Sorites Paradox – that of weakening the consequence relation – suffices to invalidate these arguments.