In this paper, we compare the comprehension of the speech act meaning of non-canonical speech acts (i.e., rhetorical questions and surprise-disapproval questions) with the comprehension of indirect speech acts (i.e., indirect requests). Both speech act types are ‘mixed’ in the sense that they involve secondary and primary illocutionary forces, but our hypothesis is that they differ in their degree of how salient their primary illocutionary force is: On the one hand, the primary illocution is signaled by non-contextual cues (non-canonical speech acts); on the other hand, it is derived via pragmatic inferencing (indirect speech acts). We thus expect their comprehension processes to be different. We conducted a judgment experiment to test whether both speech act types differ regarding how accurate the primary illocutionary force is identified and regarding how fast that force can be identified. Our results suggest that non-canonical speech acts and indirect speech acts are indeed two distinct pragmatic and psychological phenomena: While non-canonical speech acts are more accurately identified with their primary illocutionary force than indirect speech acts, participants need more time to perform this identification for non-canonical speech acts than for indirect speech acts. Our findings shed new light on the mapping between linguistic form and illocutionary force and on the pragmatic typology of speech acts in general.

This article reports on the role pragmatic inferencing plays in accounting for the ways in which native speakers perceive and interpret the semantic transparency of idioms. Although previous studies have suggested that semantic transparency intuitions of idioms are partly motivated by the conceptual metaphors that underlie them (Gibbs 1992; Gibbs et al.1997), findings from other studies (Keysar & Bly 1995, 1999) have raised questions concerning the arbitrariness of such intuitions. This study seeks to further address the discussion on the nature of semantic transparency by examining the role of pragmatic inferencing and encyclopedic world knowledge for understanding how native speakers interpret the relationship between the literal parts and figurative meanings of metaphorical idioms. To this end, semantic transparency ratings were elicited among fifteen native speakers of English for 222 metaphorical English idioms. Furthermore, raters provided qualitative support by justifying their ratings for a smaller subset of 30 idioms. These initial results were then triangulated by a follow-up exploratory study surveying etymological notes from a number of idiom dictionaries. The findings suggest that pragmatic inferencing via encyclopedic world knowledge plays an important role for the non-arbitrary way in which native speakers perceive the semantic transparency of idioms.