In 2019, the United States indicted Turkiye Halk Bankasi (Halkbank), a Turkish state-owned bank, alleging a multiyear scheme to evade US sanctions against Iran by using fraudulent transactions to transfer the proceeds of oil and gas sales to Iran. This chapter evaluates the charges against Halkbank under both US domestic law and customary international law. After briefly reviewing the charges against Halkbank and the US district court’s analysis of the extraterritoriality questions, the chapter considers the application of the US presumption against extraterritoriality, concluding that all the charges except for the bank fraud charges survive this analysis. The conclusion with respect to customary international law, however, is quite different. Under customary international law, the United States lacks jurisdiction to prescribe when its only connection to the foreign defendant is the clearing of transactions through banks in the United States. Because the International Emergency Economic Powers Act authorizes sanctions on financial transactions only when the person or property is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, the sanctions regulations cannot lawfully be applied to Halkbank.

Whilst the United States ever more frequently imposes unilateral secondary sanctions, the debate on their lawfulness has only intensified. This chapter focuses specifically on the legality of imposing access restrictions, that is, denying third state sanctions evaders access to the United States and its commercial and financial markets. Until the late 2000s, it was widely held that access restrictions were a means of enforcing US prohibitions. The issue, therefore, was whether the United States had prescriptive jurisdiction to impose such prohibitions. If not, enforcement by way of access restrictions was unlawful. More recently, this has become contested. Some now argue that access restrictions are justified on uncontroversial jurisdictional grounds because they only regulate the behaviour of US persons on US territory. Others argue that access restrictions merely amount to a lawful withdrawal of privileges. In this chapter author’s view, these arguments are not convincing. Based on the relevant US legislation, the chapter shows why access restrictions are indeed enforcement tools. Since the underlying prohibitions cannot be justified under customary international law, such enforcement is unlawful. Furthermore, the international community has consistently condemned US secondary sanctions legislation, including access restrictions, as unlawful, leading to a customary international law prohibition.

Under public international law, a State has a right to exercise jurisdiction. States are expected to show restraint when attempting to regulate a situation with foreign elements. The research outlines territory- and personality-based permissive principles of jurisdiction. EU data protection provisions that lend themselves to extraterritorial application fall into the subjective territoriality, objective territoriality, passive personality, effects doctrine and potentially protective principles of jurisdiction. The provisions do not come under any one of these principles, but rather an interpretation of several of them. The applicable law articles in the General Data Protection Regulation could most plausibly constitute the objective territoriality (where an act is terminated) and passive personality (the nationality of a victim) principles. Whilst there appears to be a shift from territory to personality, for example, by referring to data processing in the context of activities ‘in the Union’ or individuals ‘subject to the jurisdiction of’ rather than data processing in the context of the activities ‘on the territory of a Member State’ or ‘in the territory of’ each state party’, to justify the exercise of jurisdiction, territory is still necessary to trigger the application of jurisdiction in the online sphere.