This chapter explores how the imposition of unprecedented sanctions against Russia following the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the constant cat-and-mouse game of enforcement and evasion that ensued have altered the secondary sanctions landscape. More specifically, it examines to what extent, notwithstanding its longstanding and entrenched opposition to far-reaching US secondary sanctions, the European Union has gradually moved towards adding a ‘secondary’ layer to its own sanctions toolbox. The chapter first exposes the EU’s ambiguity towards extraterritoriality, both within and without the sanctions domain. It subsequently zooms in on a number of specific EU measures, namely the imposition of the so-called ‘price cap’ on Russian oil, the adoption of far-reaching import and export restrictions, including the prohibition to import certain Russian products even after these are located or have already been processed in third countries, and the threat of financial sanctions against, and criminal prosecution of, non-EU persons that facilitate the circumvention of EU sanctions against Russia. It then offers some concluding observations.

This chapter discusses restrictions on the import of Russian oil and natural gas into the U.S. and Europe. The chapter also situates this discussion in the context of European dependence on Russian energy supplies and resulting difficulties in enacting energy-related sanctions and trade restrictions. It discusses how a price cap was implemented in order to make energy-related sanctions placed on Russia more effective. Finally, it considers how policymakers are attempting to balance current energy needs with longer-term goals like reducing dependence on Russian energy supplies and building towards a more sustainable future.

Examines different forms of price regulation, including rate of return regulation, incentive regulation (such as price cap regulation), yardstick competition and earnings sharing mechanisms

The optimal form of regulation of the average price depends on the relative importance of the various sources of information asymmetry influencing the cost levels. Theory provides two main insights that hold, irrespective of the main source of distortion. The first is that the average regulated price needs to include a temporary payment to cover the price the regulator must pay to get the missing information and this price should be seen as an additional cost. The second is that the regulators should set up a menu of desirable contracts and allow the firms to self-select the contract type that best matches their capacity and risk-taking preferences; good firms (low costs) tend to prefer fixed-price contracts and bad firms (high costs) tend to prefer cost-plus. There are three main approaches to set the average price in practice: cost-plus, price caps and hybrids. Various forms of performance benchmarking can be useful complements to close the informational gap on costs and to shame poor performance (sunshine regulation). In practice, most countries are evolving towards hybrid forms of regulation emphasizing the need to account for the multiplicity of regulatory goals and informational constraints.