This chapter describes the emergence of policing as an institutional mechanism for maintaining order in increasingly urban social contexts. Through a review of prior literature, we identify three impediments to police effectiveness – autonomy, capacity, and principal–agent problems – and explain the ways in which poor performance undermines citizens’ trust in police and willingness to cooperate. Then, using data from citizen and officer surveys, we illustrate the ways in which a lack of trust between citizens and the police undermines effective policing across the six countries that are the focus of this study.

This chapter provides insights into how economics can inform managers of arts organizations. First and foremost, we discuss why arts organizations exist and how they are structured. We will cover the principal–agent theory that will inform a discussion of decision rights and incentive compensation within organizations. To gain a better understanding of organizational boundaries, we dig deeper into contract theory. Finally, we use transaction-cost economics to explain the existence of art organizations and their strategic positioning.

In the past decade, the Chinese government has resorted to forcibly shuttering entire industries or industrial areas to clean up the air. These “blunt force” measures are often taken as a sign of authoritarian efficiency; the state uses its coercive powers to swiftly eliminate polluting industries and then silence social dissent. This chapter introduces an alternate perspective: that blunt force regulation is a sign of ineffective bureaucratic control. When institutions are too weak to hold bureaucrats accountable, central leaders increase oversight by drastically reducing the number of steps and resources required to produce a regulatory outcome – resulting in blunt force measures. Through an overview of the causes and consequences of China’s blunt force pollution regulation, this chapter challenges the tenets of authoritarian environmentalism, forcing us to rethink what it means to be a “high-capacity” state.

We review recent experimental research on the behavior of street-level bureaucrats. These front-line government workers are tasked with implementing most government policy in both advanced democracies and developing countries, but their behavior is often difficult to observe. We highlight how experimental approaches have helped to address classic questions about street-level bureaucratic behavior, and then consider design challenges that arise in running experiments in this context. Finally, we raise several ethical concerns about experimentation on street-level bureaucrats, and propose strategies to minimize the social costs, and maximize the social benefits, of such research.