Chapter 3 lays out the book’s central theory as well as the theory’s observable implications. It argues that powerful producers seek to use their privileged knowledge of the risks and benefits of their products (and regulators’ dependence on that knowledge) to systematically push their own out-of-patent products and those of generic sellers off the market via regulation, in favor of more expensive, patented alternatives. Producers accomplish this first by strategically revealing negative information about out-of-patent products as a means of convincing regulators that these products require stricter regulations. Second, producers support regulatory institutions that require existing products to be reevaluated under a precautionary standard, meaning that failure to prove an existing product is safe leads to the assumption it is dangerous. These precautionary institutions help innovative producers eliminate out-of-patent products more systematically, allowing them to acquire stricter standards not via the provision of damaging information, which carries some reputational risks, but through the withholding of favorable information. This chapter also lays out expectations for where we might expect these precautionary institutions to be adopted, given the distribution of preferences across countries, and it shows why such precautionary institutions should tend to be supported by developed countries and opposed by developing ones. Finally, the chapter argues that because international standard-setters ought to be susceptible to the same sorts of information problems as domestic regulators, and given the distribution of national power within these organizations, we can expect international standard-setters to replicate the precautionary institutional preferences of their wealthier members. We can additionally expect this to create the same tendency on the part of international standard-setters to arbitrarily impose stricter standards on more affordable products, despite the fact that this creates trade barriers that disadvantage poorer members and that directly conflict with these standard-setters’ stated mission.

This chapter sets the stage for the remainder of the book by providing a broad overview of the sorts of information asymmetries that exist between producers of potentially dangerous products and those who are tasked with regulating them. Leveraging insights from a diverse set of industries -- aerospace, direct-to-consumer products, pharmaceuticals, and industrial chemicals -- and spanning a wide range of countries, this chapter establishes the surprising degree to which regulators not only are at a disadvantage relative to firms when it comes to acquiring information about product risk but also, as a result, depend on firms to be the primary source of information required to regulate. The chapter then investigates the conditions under which this might allow producers to influence the timing and direction of regulatory change. After establishing the pervasiveness of information asymmetries and dependencies at the domestic level, as well as the resulting opportunities for regulatory bias, the chapter demonstrates why we should expect the very same information asymmetries and biases to be replicated and even exacerbated at the international level.

Focusing on firm-level behavior in the US pharmaceutical and agrochemical industries, Chapter 4 provides evidence that companies do indeed seek stricter standards on their own, out-of-patent products in order to boost sales of newer, patented substitutes, even providing negative information about their own products in pursuit of this goal. In order to show this, the chapter leverages petitions submitted by pharmaceutical and agrochemical companies to the US FDA and EPA, respectively, requesting that the agencies place stricter standards or all out bans on products that these companies themselves developed. In the case of the pharmaceutical petitions, the chapter provides evidence that all but one of the requests for a product ban has targeted a drug that is about to lose or has already lost patent protection and for which the company had a more recently patented substitute. This suggests that such requests are not publicly minded attempts to ensure dangerous products remain off the market but, instead, are strategic gambits to boost profits of exclusively produced alternatives. In addition, the chapter provides a statistical analysis of petitions submitted by agrochemical companies and farm groups to show that, whereas farmers are no more likely to seek stricter standards on out-of-patent pesticides, agrochemical companies systematically request stricter standards on these products while requesting more lenient standards on products still enjoying patent protection.

The equitable obligation of confidence is used to protect information from unauthorised misuse or exploitation by others. The action now has two significant aspects; it is traditionally used to protect commercially valuable information such as trade secrets, and it is increasingly used to protect personally private information. Whether the same considerations apply to these two aspects of the action is an open question. Though the obligation of confidence is one of the oldest in equitable jurisdiction, it has only recently been called upon to protect interests previously thought to be ineffectively protected. The long hiatus between the action’s origins and its current development is partly due to the unusual position confidentiality has occupied. Whereas many equitable responsibilities, such as trust or fiduciary obligations, have no direct common law counterparts, confidentiality can be regulated by regimes other than equity. Up until the mid-twentieth century most cases concerning the equitable obligation of confidence also involved a breach of an obligation of confidence not sourced in equity

Chapter 6 focuses on labor market developments and preferences for unemployment policies. Using data from Germany, we show that increasingly, labor market risks can be predicted with a small set of observables (education, occupation, and location), while the relevance of private information has declined over time. Polarization over unemployment policies has risen at the same time. We also explore – theoretically and empirically – how people translate their labor market situation into political preferences and show the importance of social networks in the process. Lastly, the chapter describes a case study of a fascinating reform in the Swedish unemployment insurance system, which shows what happens when unemployment insurance contributions and benefits are tied to unemployment risk, as would happen in a private market. Thus, the Swedish case provides a window into the (possible) future of segmented social policy programs that we predict will become more commonplace.

The Epilogue summarizes the main points in the preceding six chapters. It emphasizes the reconstructive model of memory and how our capacity to update its content makes it adaptive and promotes flexible thought and behavior. It explores possible future forms of memory modification and specifically how a completely artificial memory system might influence how we conceive of ourselves and whether it would cause a change in this conception. The Epilogue also notes how our understanding of memory has expanded from one of private subjective information to one of public objective information about our lives and how limited we are in controlling it.