Complex governance aptly describes the nascent regulation of military and security services where a set of multi-stakeholder initiatives link action by national and international hierarchies with markets and networks around a common agenda. The regulation of small arms, however, follows more traditional forms – national hierarchies act with little coordination via one another, diametrically opposed networks battle to set the agenda, and markets are largely absent (though commercial money from arms flows through both national hierarchies and networks, market modes are not present in governance processes). Concomitant with these institutional configurations, effective governance, loosely defined as coordination of relevant actors, has progressed in military and security services but regressed in small arms. This chapter compares the evolution of governance in these two issue areas illustrating the interplay of structure and agency that yields change (or not) as well as more and less governance surrounding these two issues. It argues that while the “good enough” of complex governance may not be sufficient in some eyes, it is probably the best we can hope for and is far more likely to solve problems than forms that rely on top-down, commanding, and forceful measures alone.