The common assumption of legislative politics is that the majority party structures procedural rules to suit its interests. In a presidentialized context, however, presidential electoral incentives prevail over majority party's incentives when voting on procedural rules changes and the threat of punishing majority-party defectors is not credible when those defectors vote with the presidential candidate. To test these claims, I analyze the case of the procedural reform in the South Korean National Assembly. The case study reveals that 1) the leading presidential candidate of the ruling majority Saenuri Party compromised on the procedural reform bill that imposes restrictions on the majority party's cartel arrangement due to presidential electoral incentives; 2) a significant number of Saenuri Party members defected from the majority of their co-partisans to vote with the presidential candidate; and 3) career advancement ratio and re-nomination ratios demonstrate that those defectors were not punished afterwards.

As a result of the perception that trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) are too lengthy, a discernible shift in the trial practice of the ICTY is occurring, with a greater emphasis on the role that the judges play in controlling the proceedings. While the first few trials at the Tribunal closely resembled common law criminal trials, the level of control being exercised by the Trial Chambers in recent cases is moving more in the direction of the civil law approach. As a result, a truly mixed jurisdiction, that is, one that contains elements of both the common law and the civil law, is emerging. This evolutionary process will be examined in the context of: (1) The Rules of Procedure and Evidence and amendments thereto concerning case management; (2) examples of case management under the amended Rules; and (3) the future evolution of the ICTY.