Quelle relation les avocats entretiennent-ils avec les exigences éthiques de leur profession? Ce texte pose l’hypothèse qu’il existe un décalage entre la définition déontologique, universelle et abstraite établie par le Code de déontologie des avocats et les prises de décisions éthiques prises au quotidien par les professionnels du droit dans le contexte de leur domaine de pratique et des relations qu’ils tissent avec leurs clients, leurs collègues et l’administration judiciaire. Ainsi, nous avons identifié les différents sites de socialisation où les professionnels sont susceptibles de faire l’apprentissage des normes propres à leur pratique. Nous nous sommes alors plus directement intéressés aux dimensions systémiques et institutionnelles de celle-ci. À partir des résultats d’une série d’entretiens semi-directifs menés auprès d’avocats en droit criminel et en droit social, nous avons pu constater que leurs prises de décisions éthiques étaient fortement influencées par les manières d’être et les logiques de pratique au sein de leur communauté, c’est-à-dire par l’ethos spécifique à leur profession.

Secondary use of clinical data in research or learning activities (SeConts) has the potential to improve patient care and biomedical knowledge. Given this potential, the ethical question arises whether physicians have a professional duty to support SeConts. To investigate this question, we analyze prominent international declarations on physicians’ professional ethics to determine whether they include duties that can be considered as good reasons for a physicians’ professional duty to support SeConts. Next, we examine these documents to identify professional duties that might conflict with a potential duty of physicians to support SeConts.

The Dobbs decision has precipitated renewed medical, political, and professional interest in the issue of abortion. Because this decision handed responsibility for regulation of abortion back to the states, and because the states are enacting or have enacted policies that tend to be very permissive or very restrictive, the result has been legal and professional confusion for physicians and their patients. Medical education cannot resolve either the legal or ethical issues regarding abortion. However, medical education must prepare future physicians for caring for patients seeking abortion-related services. Physicians must be prepared to interact appropriately (sensitively and with integrity) with patients or colleagues whose views on abortion differ significantly from their own. This essay describes our educational effort to achieve that objective. The motto that governed this exercise was “No Easy Answers.”

We consider the problem of moral disjunction in professional and business activities from a virtue-ethical perspective. Moral disjunction arises when the behavioral demands of a role conflict with personal morality; it is an important problem because most people in modern societies occupy several complex roles that can cause this clash to occur. We argue that moral disjunction, and the psychological mechanisms that people use to cope with it, are problematic because they make it hard to pursue virtue and to live with integrity. We present role coadunation as a process with epistemic and behavioral aspects that people can use to resolve moral disjunction with integrity. When role coadunation is successful, it enables people to live virtuous lives of appropriate narrative disunity and to honor their identity-conferring commitments. We show how role coadunation can be facilitated by interpretive communities and discuss the emergence and ideal features of those communities.

Professional ethics has not been a major focus in industrial-organizational (I-O) psychology—in comparison with our study of unethical behavior in organizations. Consequently, we know very little about ethical situations actually faced by I-O psychologists. This article presents and tests a structural perspective on understanding the nature of ethical dilemmas that can facilitate such study. A taxonomy of five paradigmatic forms of ethical dilemmas is defined and placed in a theoretical context. Narrative descriptions of 292 ethical situations were obtained from a sample of 228 professional members of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology (SIOP) in the United States and were used to empirically test the taxonomy. The narratives were content analyzed for form of dilemma, work domain of occurrence, relevance to human resource administration concerns, and favorability of the situation’s resolution. The work domains that were most problematic were academic research/publication activities, individual assessment/assessment centers, consulting issues regarding the client, and academic supervising/mentoring. There were no significant differences as a function of respondents’ sex, seniority, or professional membership status (member/fellow). This relatively “content free” structural aspect of ethical dilemmas enables comparisons across different domains (of professions, organizations, demographic groups, age cohorts, etc.) in which the overt idiosyncratic ethical problems experienced are not commensurable. Similarly, it can yield interpretable longitudinal comparisons despite changes in the manifestations of ethical problems encountered over time.

Fear of life, fear of death, and fear of causing death form a combination that prevents reasoned changes in laws concerning end-of-life situations. This is shown systematically in this article using the methods of conceptual analysis. Prevalent fears are explicated and interpreted to see how their meanings differ depending on the chosen normative stance. When the meanings have been clarified, the impact of the fears on the motivations and justifications of potential legislative reforms are assessed. Two main normative stances are evoked. The first makes an appeal to individual self-determination, or autonomy, and the second to the traditional professional ethics of physicians. These views partly share qualifying elements, including incurability and irreversibility of the patient’s medical condition, proximity of death, the unbearable nature of suffering, and issues of voluntariness further shade the matter. The conclusion is that although many motives to change end-of-life laws are admirable, they are partly contradictory, as are calls for autonomy and appeals to professional ethics; to a degree that good, principled legislative solutions remain improbable in the foreseeable future.

According to the market failures approach to business ethics, beyond-compliance duties can be derived by employing the same rationale and arguments that justify state regulation of economic conduct. Very roughly, the idea is that managers have a duty to behave as if they were complying with an ideal regulatory regime ensuring Pareto-optimal market outcomes. Proponents of the approach argue that managers have a professional duty not to undermine the institutional setting that defines their role, namely the competitive market. This answer is inadequate, however, for it is the hierarchical firm, rather than the competitive market, that defines the role of corporate managers and shapes their professional obligations. Thus, if the obligations that the market failures approach generates are to apply to managers, they must do so in an indirect way. I suggest that the obligations the market failures approach generates directly apply to shareholders. Managers, in turn, inherit these obligations as part of their duties as loyal agents.

Recently the scope of protections afforded those healthcare professionals and institutions that refuse to provide certain interventions on the grounds of conscience have expanded, in some instances insulating providers (institutional and individual) from any liability or sanction for harms that patients experience as a result. With the exponential increase in the penetration of Catholic-affiliated healthcare across the country, physicians and nurses who are not practicing Catholics are nevertheless required to execute documents pledging to conform their patient care to the Ethical and Religious Directives for Health Care Services as a condition of employment or medical staff privileges. In some instances, doing so may result in patient morbidity or mortality or violate professional standards for respecting advance directives or surrogate decisionmaking. This article challenges the ethical propriety of such institutional mandates and argues that legal protections for conscientious refusal must provide redress for patients who are harmed by care that falls below the prevailing clinical standards.

CQ welcomes readers’ comments on papers published in the journal. Please send submissions to T. Kushner at kushnertk@gmail.com.