This study examined the way organizations were involved in the response to the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV, MERS) outbreak that occurred in Korea in 2015.

We collected organizational network data through a content analysis of online news articles and the government’s white paper. Social network analysis was used to analyze the key organizations and their connections in crucial response tasks.

Three national health authorities (Central MERS Management Headquarters [CMMH], Korea Centers for Disease Control [KCDC], Ministry of Health and Welfare [MOHW]) led the response. CMMH, which did not appear in the government’s response plans, played a significant role in all 3 networks. KCDC also was involved in all 3 networks, but was most prominent in the laboratory testing network. MOHW appeared only in the patient management network. Each health authority coordinated and collaborated with distinctive types of organizations in the networks, but unclear lines of responsibilities also were found.

The study demonstrated that the roles and responsibilities of health authorities at the national level were fragmented and lacked clarity. Public health emergency preparedness must consider carefully the way to establish collaborative response systems.

Research has shown that partnerships between public health agencies, service providers, and other key stakeholders can expand resources and facilitate focus on community health issues more effectively than can any agency or organization acting alone. There is, however, little empirical evidence drawn from actual public health emergency responses to support this claim. The US response to novel influenza A (H1N1) virus provided the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) the opportunity to explore whether, and the extent to which, state, local and territorial health departments strengthened partnerships with key partner agencies and sectors.

Participants included the CDC Public Health Emergency Response (PHER) grantees comprised of 62 state, territorial and local health departments. PHER grantees completed an assessment instrument in May 2011, including questions asking them to rate their partnership strength (on a four-point ordinal scale) with six types of partners before and after the H1N1 response. Grantees additionally reported if and how PHER funding contributed to enhancing the strength of these partnerships.

Sixty-one PHER grantees (61/62, 98%) completed the assessment instrument's partnerships section. PHER grantees reported that their partnerships with retail pharmacies were most strengthened (mean increase = 1.11 (on a four-point ordinal scale), SD = .82). This was followed by schools (K-12) (mean increase = .90, SD = .58); private medical providers (mean increase = .81, SD = .68); immunization authorities (mean increase = .80, SD = .61); main education authorities (mean increase = .75, SD = .68); and businesses (mean increase = .74, SD = .61). Mean PHER grantee increases in the strength of each partner type were statistically significant for all partner types (P < .01). Grantees reported that PHER funding contributed to enhancing the strength of their partnerships with schools most frequently (46/46, 100%), and businesses least frequently (31/37, 83.8%).

This inquiry provides evidence that state, territorial, and local health department partnerships with key sectors, agencies, and programs were strengthened after the H1N1 response. It further demonstrates that the CDC's PHER funding contributed to the health departments’ reports of increased partnership strength.

KunK, ZimmermanJ, RoseD, RubelS. State, Territorial, and Local Health Departments’ Reporting of Partnership Strength Before and After the H1N1 Response. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2013;28(6):1-6.

Standardized, validated training programs for teaching administrative decision-making to healthcare professionals responding to weapons of mass destruction (weapons of mass destruction) incidents have not been available. Therefore, a multidisciplinary team designed, developed, and offered a four-day, functional exercise, competency-based course at a national training center.

This report provides a description of the development and initial evaluation of the course in changing participants' perceptions of their capabilities to respond to weapons of mass destruction events.

Course participants were healthcare professionals, including physicians, nurses, emergency medical services administrators, hospital administrators, and public health officials. Each course included three modified tabletop and/or real-time functional exercises. A total of 441 participants attended one of the eight course offerings between March and August 2003. An intervention group only, pre-post design was used to evaluate change in perceived capabilities related to administrative decision-making for weapons of mass destruction incidents. Paired evaluation data were available on 339 participants (81.9%). Self-ratings for each of 21 capability statements were compared before and after the course. A 19-item total scale score for each participant was calculated from the pre-course and post-course evaluations. Paired t-tests on pre- and postcourse total scores were conducted separately for each course.

There was consistent improvement in self-rated capabilities after course completion for all 21 capability statements. Paired t-tests of pre- and postcourse total scale scores indicated a significant increase in mean ratings for each course (all p <0.001).

The tabletop/real-time-exercise format was effective in increasing healthcare administrators' self-rated capabilities related to weapons of mass destruction disaster management and response. Integrating the competencies into training interventions designed for a specific target audience and deploying them into an interactive learning environment allowed the competency-based training objectives to be accomplished.