Archival documents from a construction and engineering team show that people went through the motions in a slapdash way when filling out forms detailing what they had done in April, May, and June 1989.

A political culture of falsehoods was alive and well in 1989 as people caught up in the purge fabricated or downplayed what they had done during the protests. This allowed them to protect themselves and to shield others from punishment. Widespread passive resistance against the purge meant that it ended with a whimper in 1990. Some participants in the protests refused to lie. They remained defiant and suffered harsh punishments. Officials who enthusiastically oversaw the purge were rewarded with promotions.

Policy documents show that the post-massacre purge was akin to a political movement, or yundong, but was not allowed to be called a yundong. Central purge officials carefully identified purge targets and procedures in their effort to punish disloyalty and reward compliance in late 1989 and early 1990.

The aftermath of the Beijing massacre was as momentous as the crackdown itself. “Purging and sorting-out work” compelled all Beijing work units to investigate people who had been involved in the spring’s demonstrations, and all urban Party members were required to reregister and affirm their loyalty. Ever since 1989, the Party has handled the aftermath of June Fourth like an abusive partner who knows that they have done something wrong but still uses the threat of violence to force compliance from the citizens of China.