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Neither Freud’s extrapolation from the endpoint of the analysis of dreams to their origin nor his attempt to derive the account from general theory appears to support the conclusions he reaches about dreaming. The gap in his argument appears not to have an equal in his other lines of writing. Consequently:
1.The Interpretation of Dreams cannot form the bedrock of his other treatises.
2. His larger project, consequently, is little affected by the weakness of the tract.
3. We need not, on those accounts, abandon the practice of interpreting dreams.
4. We may still be driven by a pleasure principle, even if dreams do not carry out wish-fulfillment.
Freud might have been blindsided, in formulating his dreams theory, by his insistence that all mental processes are purposive. Purposiveness may be incompatible with sleeping, and by extension dreaming. The apparatus Freud maps out in The Interpretation of Dreams and elsewhere may pertain only, though still illuminatingly, to waking life.
Any account of social action presupposes an ontology of action whether this is made explicit or not. This chapter reviews the problem of defining and analyzing action in interaction, and to propose a solution. It describes three dimensions of contrast in the analysis of action. A first point is that both purposive action and non-intentional effects can be seen as ways to do things with words but, as we shall see, they differ in many respects. Second, there is a need to distinguish explicit from primary in action. And third, one can need to distinguish between the constitution of action, on the one hand, and the ex post facto description of action, on the other. The chapter describes the components and types of action in interaction. It discusses two case studies: how it is that actions are recognized and thereby consummated, both by participants in social interaction and by analysts.
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