States usually intervene in failed states for broader strategic or humanitarian motives. However, chapter 6 uses Somalia, the Democratic Repblic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan to show that most African interveners lent their support to one side or the other in these lawless lands in the pursuit of their own interests. In the DRC, external interveners were primarily interested in looting rather than in Congo’s stability. In Somalia, Ethiopia switched from hostile to supportive military interventions in an attempt to dampen Islamist influence while also creating a weak transitional government it could easily manipulate. Kenya and Eritrea, in contrast, intervened in order to establish a strong Somali state capable of counterbalancing Ethiopia’s hegemonic aspirations in the horn of Africa. Unlike the first two cases, South Sudan did not experience multiple military interventions despite encountering similar conditions. This negative case is the result of Ethiopia’s restraint from taking any military action to support its kin, the Nuer, because it feared upsetting the ethnic balance in its eastern region. Results from qualitative comparative analysis show that most African interveners are motivated to dispatch their militaries to failed states by the presence of prominent roles, rebel sanctuaries, lootable resources, and domestic pressures.

Hostile military interventions have been common in postcolonial Africa. Chapter 4 begins with East Africa, the locale of the largest number of hostile military interventions. Central Africa, Southern Africa, North Africa, and West Africa follow. Many of these hostile interventions have targeted transnational rebels operating from neighboring states that pose a challenge to the incumbent regime. Ideological rivalry played a role in state sponsorship of rebel groups and interstate tensions during the Cold War, and local interstate rivalries have been present in the post-Cold War period. Although some regional differences emerged in the historical narrative, results from qualitative comparative analysis suggest that states with prominent foreign policy roles on the continent target rebels in neighboring states, but when rivalries or subsystemic crises are present states without prominent role status intervene as well. Domestic conditions may also pose a challenge to a government’s tenure and compel it to use hostile force, often against targets that represent a tangible threat to the ruling ethnic group. Negative economic growth and inflation are the domestic pressures that most frequently help to explain hostile military intervention in postcolonial Africa, demonstrating that when combined with other conditions the diversionary argument has purchase in this context.