In this chapter, we begin by examining the role of reflective practice in partnership work and in doing so highlight the importance of knowing yourself and who you are as person. In Chapter 7, we critically examine reflective practice and how it unfolds in partnership work. In this chapter, we introduce the notion of reflective practice and how it prepares educators to begin thinking about how to come together with families. As you commence this journey of self-reflection, you will come to understand the complexity of partnership work and the skills you might need to develop to effectively engage with difference. We then explore some of the key ideas underpinning the planning of partnership work, including the importance of communication and open and positive mindsets, as well as the idea of active engagement and development of intercultural knowledge and capabilities. Through this examination, you will come to understand the first premise of the TWINE Model of Partnership so that you can identify as well as learn how to draw on this premise of the model when planning for partnership work.

Chapter 6 unpacks the idea of reflexivity in judicial decision-making and its relationship with coherence. The chapter’s thesis is that coherence in legal reasoning and one’s commitment to reflexivity are intrinsically related notions. Reflexivity in adjudication is conducive towards coherence and, by extension, the degree of a decision-maker’s reflexivity can act as a useful indicator (though not a determinant) of the decision’s overall coherence. The chapter proceeds in two steps in particular. Firstly, it describes reflexivity as an overall desirable disposition for adjudicators to have. It identifies key components of reflexivity in practical decision-making, considers potential critiques, and ultimately establishes reflexivity as an indicator of coherence. Secondly, the chapter attempts to place the discussion in a practical context by way of a case study on the reflective thinking likely at play behind decisions addressing nationality planning activities by foreign investors. In so doing, the chapter also reviews instances where an arguably inadequate process of reflection may have negatively affected the overall coherence of an arbitral decision.

Chapter 1 points to two problems with the deduction of the principle of the purposiveness of nature in the Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The first is that it assumes that empirical knowledge must take the form of a comprehensive hierarchical taxonomy of empirical concepts – but does not explain why. Second, Kant creates high expectations by employing the demanding term "deduction" and promising to seek the grounds of the principle of the purposiveness of nature in the “sources of cognition a priori” – but appears simply to declare that finding a hierarchical system of empirical laws is a need of the understanding and that although we have no a priori insight into its existence “such a unity must still necessarily be presupposed and assumed” by the power of judgment. The Introduction further emphasizes the importance of the notion of pleasure and its relation to our successful attempts to discover the conceptual order of nature. It also argues that the introduction of the aesthetic and logical aspects of the purposiveness of nature gives us good reason to think that the two principal parts of the book are concerned with the latter notion and its transcendental role.

Chapter 3 tackles the considerable exegetical difficulties posed by the antinomy of teleological judgment. Although the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment poses an antinomy between regulative maxims of reflective judgment, it also presents a conflict between would-be constitutive principles of determinative judgment. This fact has led a number of readers to conclude that the latter conflict is the antinomy of teleological judgment and the former is its resolution – Kant’s explicit claims to the contrary notwithstanding. The chapter argues that posing the conflict between would-be constitutive principles of determinative judgment is explained by the attempt to assimilate characteristic features of a dialectic, specifically the fact that it ensnares ordinary understanding. Building on the earlier discussion of the distinction between explanation and description, it further claims that the regulative maxims of reflective judgment do not contradict one another, even as they are first presented, but in fact essentially complement one another. The maxim of teleology governs the description or observation of organisms as self-organizing beings; the maxim of mechanism directs us to seek to explain their generation and the processes they undergo mechanistically, just as all other causal processes are to be explained.

The previous chapters have explored the teaching methodologies and concepts related to different forms of the Arts, as well as methodologies for integration and organisation. However, in addition to being able to teach the Arts, we need to have in place a system for evaluating the teaching process to ensure that the outcomes and goals we wish to achieve are met for the learners. There has been a great deal of research to identify specific teaching practices that can improve children’s outcomes. This chapter does not intend to analyse the validity or otherwise of these outcomes, as these are mandated by the various examination and education boards. In part, this is because it is difficult to isolate any specific technique or learning skill that works for individuals because all children have unique and individual learning styles. For these reasons, the focus of recent research has been to isolate general characteristics.