Although states of most types receive distinct advantages when they formalize their cooperation through public, legally binding agreements, we argue that absolute monarchs are uniquely able to capture personal benefits from secret, cartel-like cooperation. Domestic decision-making in absolute monarchies is unchecked, nontransparent, and highly personal, and these norms reproduce themselves at the international level when absolute monarchs cooperate with each other. We assess the explanatory strength of our theory through two in-depth case studies. First, we examine how the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian monarchs used informal agreements strategically during the Concert of Europe to suppress domestic unrest. Second, we explore how the Iraqi, Jordanian, and Saudi monarchs used secret agreements to counter domestic pro-republican sentiment in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Irrespective of geography, religion, and time period, the nontransparent and unilateral manner with which absolute monarchs implement domestic policies facilitates and encourages this type of informal cooperation.

This chapter discloses the functions of the nonprofit sector in non-Western democratic national contexts and argues that a state’s political regime is related to the hierarchy of functions performed by the nonprofit sector in that state. The authors focus on the function of legitimacy and the ways the nonprofit sector performs it in a non-democratic context, with Russia as an example. They construct a theoretical model that explains why nonprofits instead of other organizations fulfill certain functions in nondemocratic regimes. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the model’s relevance to other nondemocratic contexts.

This chapter outlines a possible explanation for the overall stability of the Israeli regime based on the concept of state capacity, namely, the ability of the state to use coercive and administrative capabilities to “get things done.” It therefore emphasizes the role of the state itself in explaining the regime. The first section provides a short conceptual clarification of the concept of state capacity and its relationship with regime stability. This is followed by a presentation of the historical origins of Israeli state capacity and some measures of its capacity. The main part of this chapter discusses the ways in which state capacity sustains the regime’s stability in light of three challenges: the internal aspect of the conflict, the challenge to state authority from political tensions among its Jewish citizens, and the ways in which the zones of control have shifted according to the limited ability of state capacity to ensure direct control of the entire Occupied Territories.

The fast-growing economies of the combined lower- and middle-income countries have propelled them into new strategic and economic alliances, often bypassing the developed world. These changing patterns of global connectivity are rewiring the underlying grid. The West is no longer blindly imitated by others, even among its developing-nation allies. The very quality that sets the Western legal tradition apart – its judicial institutions whose legitimacy resides in binding those who govern to the same laws as other citizens – has rarely transferred effectively to regions where the cultural antecedents are absent. It is no longer possible to deny that China’s spectacular performance in raising its living standards has shown an alternative. Inevitably, this divergence will be projected onto struggles for shaping the policies of global institutions, their governance, and perceptions of their legitimacy. How China or the West handle other threats – forced migration, internal displacement, global radicalization – will have a great bearing on their relative global influence and ability to shape the trajectory of the world economy.

In this chaper, I examine the relationship between landholding inequality, interventions in agricultural markets, and the stability of authoritarian regimes. I construct measures of the size of rents that are generated by agricultural market distortions. I show that both forms of agricultural rents are much smaller than those originating from oil revenues. I then go on to estimate a series of models of authoritarian regime durability. I test whether landed elites are threatening to authoritarian regimes, and concentrations of landholdings are associated with a greater risk of regime collapse. I find a weak positive relationship between landholding inequality and the likelihood of collapse. I look at the relationship between agricultural rents and regime durability. I find that rents that accrue to the state have no effect on the probability of regime collapse. Rents accruing to agricultural producers, however, do have a significant interactive effect on regime stability. Where landholding inequality is high, regimes that distribute greater rents to the agricultural sector are significantly less likely to break down.