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The market of non-fungible tokens (NFTs) is rapidly growing and their potential uses and applications are still being discovered. The rapid growth of this market, coupled with the unique nature of NFTs, which do not fit squarely within the existing regulatory frameworks, creates a regulatory gap between existing and effective regulation of NFTs. This gap, in turn, creates a policy-making dilemma: on the one hand, regulating NFTs too quickly could prevent efficient uses and applications from being discovered and deployed, thus stifling innovation. On the other, leaving NFTs unregulated could leave investors unprotected from the risks posed by this innovation. With this dilemma in mind, this chapter argues that regulation of NFTs should occur sparingly, and to the extent that it does occur, regulatory experimentation and competition emerges as the most promising approach. In the US, one place where regulatory competition exists is between and among the states. State regulation in the areas of securities and virtual currency and money transmission can be used to address some of the prominent present concerns posed by NFTs, such as frauds and money laundering, and states have the opportunity to experiment as NFTs evolve and are refined.
This chapter situates the emergence of leniency programmes in competition law in the broader context of contemporary trends in business regulation. It is suggested that although leniency programmes are a distinctive form of regulatory intervention, they do exhibit a family resemblance with other regulatory mechanisms that have emerged in the last two decades in other fields of business regulation, and that similar trends, pressures and effects can be seen across different regulatory contexts. The four trends highlighted are a shift towards some form of negotiated justice, a new emphasis on regulatory experimentation, the creation of new forms of transnational legal risk, and the emerging importance of regulatory networks. The intention of this chapter is not to blur the distinction between these different developments, but rather to suggest that by locating leniency in the context of these broader trends, we can deepen our understanding of the significance of these developments.
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