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This chapter analyses the regulatory framework of bankers’ remuneration in China. The framework is comprised of the CBRC Guidelines and the MOF Measures. The CBRC Guidelines are based on the FSB principles and standards, aiming to guide banks to apply modern remuneration incentives. The MOF Measures are special for SOCBs and SOE-controlled banks, which contain a series of compulsory rules on the level and structure of remuneration and a detailed system of performance assessment. In addition, the MOF imposed a temporary ban on equity-based remuneration, and the CPC issued a policy to reduce and cap the level of remuneration in these banks. These requirements are intrusive, which consolidate state intervention in the practice of bankers’ remuneration while contradictory to the objective of the regulation-led reform.
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