The chapter discusses the mechanisms international alw has at its disposal to stimulate compliance with its rules: sanctions, counter-measures, colelctive action

Chapter 17 attempts to pin down a moving target, cyber and its use and utility in armed conflict. The cyber targets chosen by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are detailed. The chapter defines cyber “attacks,” differentiating them from cyber “operations” – akin to a felony-misdemeanor distinction. Cyberattacks are found to be a use of armed force, in the sense of UN Charter Article 2(4), raising the right of victim states to respond with armed force in self-defense. Potential cyber conflicts are classified as international or non-international based upon their perpetrators. The difficulties of attribution of cyberattacks are detailed, including sovereignty and military necessity. A counter to cyberattack is belligerent reprisal, which is explored. Cyberattacks on critical national infrastructure (CNI) are a major problem. After defining CNI, the US position on responses is discussed. Recent changes in US cyber policy authorize far greater cyber retaliation and reprisal, as well as providing federal funding to carry them out. Finally, CNI’s weak link, the unwillingness of civilian corporations to fund their own cyber protection, is noted.

This chapter traces the practice of concluding peace treaties in Early Modern Europe, characterised by the increasing standardisation of clauses, as well as the influence of the concept of legal (or formal) war alongside that of just war. While just war retained an important role in the justification of war, treaty-making practice tended to rely on legal war, which produced a dualist logic in both war-waging and peace-making. Over time, the settlement of territorial conflicts moved from pre-existing claims and rights to conquest as a basis; dynastic legitimacy was subordinated to the raison d’etat. Increasingly standardised amnesty and restitution clauses, retractions of letters of reprisal, and provisions on prisoners of war likewise bore the influence of the legal war concept. Finally, to deal with the ever wider disruption caused by war, separate FCN treaties emerged alongside peace treaties. Later on, the 1919 Treaty of Versailles marked a brief return to a discriminatory concept of war, but its longer-lasting impact was on collective security and compensation of war damage for citizens.

The chapter discusses the mechanisms international alw has at its disposal to stimulate compliance with its rules: sanctions, counter-measures, colelctive action

Piracy, or violent despoliation at sea, is ancient, yet it took on global dimensions after 1500. This chapter examines piratical violence as an early modern, global, cross-cultural phenomenon motivated by politics and religion as well as profit. Varieties of piracy ranged from random pillage of merchant vessels to state-sanctioned corsairing companies. Forms of violence included murder, kidnapping, enslavement, rape, battery, mutilation, impressment and forced conversion. In some regions, extortion rackets formed wherein the threat of piratical violence was offset by regular payments. Rising seaborne violence prompted consequential reactions, from naval arms races to coastal depopulation. By the eighteenth century powerful states such as Great Britain and Qing dynasty China passed harsh anti-piracy laws and outfitted navies for pirate extermination, which led to the jailing and execution of many suspects, some of them innocent. Sea sovereignty came to be defined as monopolising violence at sea and treating anyone defined as a pirate as subject to harsher laws than those applied to land thieves. By this logic, pirates were ‘enemies of humankind’.

Chapter 5 looks at the other form of contributory fault: a defence called investment reprisal. Aside from the different causal relation that an instance of investment reprisal has to the relevant loss in comparison to mismanagement, the former involves wrongful conduct on the part of the investor, rather than risky conduct. For this reason, investment reprisal is a form of investor misconduct, which brings it close to another defence: post-establishment illegality. In establishing their doctrinal foundations, special attention is paid to how the circumstances that activate them differ from similar circumstances that relate to different rules, such as the legality requirement for jurisdiction. The bulk of this chapter is dedicated to detailing these defences’ legal content and traversing the difficult questions on jurisdiction and admissibility that they raise. Again, the opportunity is taken to propose a reason-based method for apportioning liability when these defences apply, and the concluding sections distinguish them from other related legal concepts.