In this and the following chapters, I analyse several attempts to interrupt the abyssal nature of modern law emerging from my previous research on sociology of law. I try to identify the reasons why most of such attempts failed or are about to fail. This chapter analyses the phenomenon of popular justice in Portugal during the revolutionary crisis that became known as the 25 April Revolution or Carnation Revolution. During the course of the revolutionary crisis (April 1974-November 1975) many popular movements emerged. They differed in terms of social objectives, strategy and tactics, organisational strength, degree of control by formal political organisations, and other factors, but shared the same class composition: the urban or rural working class (and occasionally the peasantry) allied themselves with radicalised sectors of the urban petty bourgeoisie. As these movements emerged during a revolutionary crisis, all of them questioned the legitimacy of the capitalist state. Popular justice in Portugal after 25 April 1974 involved a wide range of actions varying in political scope, the degree and type of popular mobilisation and internal organisation, and the level of confrontation with official justice. As a descriptive strategy, the range of cases and situations may be grouped into two categories: the struggle for the redefinition of criminal justice, and the struggle for the right to decent housing. Within each category, I begin with a brief narrative of cases that relate more or less remotely to the concept of popular justice and then concentrate my analysis on the most representative examples. Were there failed attempts at post-abyssal legality?

Chapter 3 charts the consolidation of judicial review during the first period of direct and indirect martial rule under the Ayub regime (1958–1968). Despite the military–bureaucratic authoritarianism of the Ayub era and the judicial validation of Martial Law, the courts managed to preserve the judicial review of bureaucratic action. The exercise of the Writ jurisdiction aligned with the priorities of a Martial Law regime that was attempting to subdue and co-opt a hitherto powerful bureaucracy. In the post-Martial Law phase, the promulgation of the 1962 Constitution provided the courts with the basis to consolidate the foundations of the Writ jurisdiction along three axes – formal constitutionalism, administrative law and procedural safeguards against the abuse of public order and state security laws – which have remained at the core of the superior courts’ definition of rule of law in the decades since.

Borrowing Gerry Simpson’s taxonomy, it was and remains common to think of the Soviet Union as both a ‘great power’ and an ‘outlaw state’. Some historical accounts portray Soviet law as elaborate, specific and complex; but simultaneously, others portray ‘Soviet law’ as a sham. This essay argues that the Soviet approach to Cold War international law hews closer to the former image than the latter. It appears that Soviet faith in international law grew over the course of the Cold War, rather than diminished. This essay is a tentative sketch of the transformation of Soviet faith in law over the course of the Cold War.