We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter explores the limits of Lyndon Johnson’s capacity to empathize with and understand the peoples of the decolonizing world during his presidency and the implications of his experience for the America he left behind. It traces Johnson’s view of the decolonizing world in the context of the Cold War, showing how his understanding of revolutionary nationalism and the social, political, and economic problems left behind by European colonialism evolved – or failed to evolve – alongside his increasingly progressive definition of democracy at home. Acknowledging his truly ambitious vision of a “global Great Society,” which promised innovative global health, education, and anti-poverty initiatives to the Third World, the chapter ultimately shows how Johnson failed to fulfill his promises to redefine US national interests in the world around compassion for the marginalized. Instead, in his dealings with Third World leaders, he often reverted to the kind of transactional power politics that had served him so well in the Senate, failing to see how central the value of self-determination was to anti-colonial movements and their representatives. In the final analysis, this chapter uses Johnson’s example to investigate the limitations of compassion in US foreign relations more broadly.
The postwar world began in 1919, with the signing of the Versailles peace treaty. This chapter explores aspects of the international system of the 1920s and the role played by the United States in its evolution and preservation. First of all, despite the confusion of the immediate postwar years, the major powers showed remarkable readiness to undertake programs of disarmament. Disarmament could not be separated from other questions of Asian-Pacific security, in particular the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the fortification of the powers' bases in the Pacific Ocean. The peace of the 1920s was built on more than merely disarmament agreements. It was sustained through various other arrangements, including the League of Nations, the Locarno Conference treaties in Europe, and the Washington Conference treaties for Asia. In the meantime, in Europe the postwar peace remained fragile in the immediate aftermath of the Versailles conference.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.