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People who tend to impulsively choose smaller, sooner rewards over larger, later rewards are at increased risk for addiction and psychiatric disorders. A neurobiological measure of the tendency to overvalue immediate gratification could facilitate the study of individuals who are susceptible to these mental disorders. The objective of this research was to develop a cortical assay of impulsive choice for immediate rewards.
Methods
A cortex-based assay of impulsive choice was developed using 1105 healthy adults from the Human Connectome Project, and then cross-validated in two independent samples of adults with elevated rates of psychiatric disorders.
Results
Study 1: Cortical delay discounting (C-DD) was developed using a multivariate additive model of gray matter thickness across both hemispheres. Higher C-DD corresponded to thinner cortex and greater impulsive choice for immediate rewards. It also predicted cannabis use beyond established risk factors for drug use, including familial substance use, childhood conduct problems, personality traits, and cognitive functioning. Study 2: C-DD replicated the association with delay discounting performance from study 1. Structural equation modeling showed C-DD covaried with symptoms of externalizing, but not internalizing disorders. Study 3: C-DD positively predicted future delay discounting behavior (6–34 months later).
Conclusions
Across three studies, a cortical assay of impulsive choice evidenced consistent associations with drug use and delay discounting task performance. It was also uniquely associated with psychiatric disorders that share impulsivity as a core feature. Together, findings support the utility of C-DD as a neurobiological assay of impulsive decision-making and a possible biomarker of externalizing disorders.
Abnormal effort-based decision-making represents a potential mechanism underlying motivational deficits (amotivation) in psychotic disorders. Previous research identified effort allocation impairment in chronic schizophrenia and focused mostly on physical effort modality. No study has investigated cognitive effort allocation in first-episode psychosis (FEP).
Method
Cognitive effort allocation was examined in 40 FEP patients and 44 demographically-matched healthy controls, using Cognitive Effort-Discounting (COGED) paradigm which quantified participants’ willingness to expend cognitive effort in terms of explicit, continuous discounting of monetary rewards based on parametrically-varied cognitive demands (levels N of N-back task). Relationship between reward-discounting and amotivation was investigated. Group differences in reward-magnitude and effort-cost sensitivity, and differential associations of these sensitivity indices with amotivation were explored.
Results
Patients displayed significantly greater reward-discounting than controls. In particular, such discounting was most pronounced in patients with high levels of amotivation even when N-back performance and reward base amount were taken into consideration. Moreover, patients exhibited reduced reward-benefit sensitivity and effort-cost sensitivity relative to controls, and that decreased sensitivity to reward-benefit but not effort-cost was correlated with diminished motivation. Reward-discounting and sensitivity indices were generally unrelated to other symptom dimensions, antipsychotic dose and cognitive deficits.
Conclusion
This study provides the first evidence of cognitive effort-based decision-making impairment in FEP, and indicates that decreased effort expenditure is associated with amotivation. Our findings further suggest that abnormal effort allocation and amotivation might primarily be related to blunted reward valuation. Prospective research is required to clarify the utility of effort-based measures in predicting amotivation and functional outcome in FEP.
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