In this chapter, I examine whether punishment is morally permissible. Criminal prosecution and punishment are the main functions of international criminal justice and lie at the heart of what institutions of international criminal justice – such as the International Criminal Court – do. To begin, I reconstruct Locke’s argument for the permissibility of punishment. Locke argues that we have a moral duty to ‘preserve humanity’ and we can discharge that duty by exercising our ‘natural executive right’ – that is, a right to punish – in the state of nature. Punishments are effective in enforcing rights because they deter crimes. I discuss several objections against the consequentialist structure of Locke’s argument. To counter these objections, I argue for a mixed theory that distinguishes between justifying the practice of punishment and justifying the distribution of punishment within that practice. To explain the latter, we must take into account considerations of normative individualism, egalitarianism, and pragmatic considerations. Taken together, these arguments imply that coercive punishment is permissible for natural rights enforcement.

Chapter 2 introduces the conceptual and theoretical frameworks, as well as the study’s methodology. In this chapter I propose and defend a conceptualization of judicial impact. Then, I develop and explain the main argument: that two elements are key to shaping impact for structural rulings, namely monitoring mechanisms and legal constituencies. Deploying monitoring mechanisms allows courts (and other participants in monitoring venues) to impose costs on the targets of the rulings and to offset information and power asymmetries. Legally empowered advocacy organizations (legal constituencies) can exercise legal follow-up and mobilize around the issue in the aftermath of the ruling. On their own, the presence of court-promoted oversight mechanisms or of legal constituencies can promote some effects. However, when combined, they can configure a collaborative oversight arena and ultimately yield higher impact results. The chapter closes explaining the research design: I introduce the eight case studies (four rulings from Argentina and four from Colombia) and the logic of the cross-case comparisons.

Chapter 7 provides an overview of the book, its main findings and refinements to the theory based on the lessons learned. It closes by presenting the study’s broader implications for normative arguments against judicial intervention on socioeconomic rights, and for theories of judicial power. This book shows that high courts can contribute to the advancement of rights, though they cannot do so alone nor can they offer silver bullets. The Colombian and Argentine highest tribunals have, at times, successfully configured important new political spaces for effective pursuit of public policy goals, in conjunction and dialogue with external actors. In doing so, they have increased their power and positioned themselves as non-negligible political forces.

Chapter 3 presents comparative case studies of two structural socioeconomic rights rulings: Argentina’s Causa Mendoza – an environmental ruling – and Colombia’s T-760 – a ruling safeguarding the right to health. In both cases, a collaborative oversight arena was created as a result of the convergence of legally empowered advocacy organizations and court-promoted monitoring mechanisms. The collaborative oversight arenas created spaces in which different participants could exercise accountability for unfulfilled commitments from the government and private agents and, more specifically, for the implementation of different aspects of the rulings. Additionally, the creation of spaces for sustained interaction around offered the chance for the diffusion of policy ideas and a rights-based framework, while giving civil society actors access to the state. The case studies also identify unintended and negative consequences from the rulings, recognizing these as integral parts of impact.

Chapter 6 asks and answers the following question: Is there evidence that the presence of monitoring mechanisms and legally empowered organizations in civil society help us understand whether and to what extent other structural rulings (beyond those studied in previous chapters) can have significant impact? This chapter explores this question in a bounded manner, by conducting shadow case studies of rulings decided by the Indian Supreme Court. Here I use insights from the theoretical framework developed and illustrated in the Latin American context and apply them to the analysis of two rulings handed down by the Indian highest tribunal: the Right to Food case and the Delhi Vehicular Pollution case. Building on prior works and original research, the chapter shows that the creation of collaborative monitoring spaces in India also enhanced accountability and showed potential to shift the balance of power between a reluctant government and the litigants, allowing civil society actors, as well as others, access, and an unprecedented platform. At the same time, the cross-regional comparison highlights the dangers in lengthy time frames and excessive procedural flexibility.

Chapter 4 presents case studies of the impact of four landmark socioeconomic rights rulings. Each pair of case studies seeks to uncover the influence that one of two elements can have on judicial impact: court-promoted monitoring mechanisms and the presence of legal constituencies. The first pair of cases explores the aftermath of rulings that have dense legal constituencies but no court-promoted oversight mechanisms: First, Causa Verbitsky in Argentina, a decision in which the court safeguarded the rights of inmates in the Buenos Aires Province. Second, C-383 1999 in Colombia, a decision in which the court safeguarded the right to housing of Colombian mortgage debtors. The second paired comparison looks at two structural rulings in which monitoring mechanisms were put in place but where there were low density legal constituencies. The first case in this pair is Causa Badaro in Argentina, a decision in which the court protected the right to pension of Argentine seniors earning above 1,000 Argentine pesos. The second case is T-547 2010 in Colombia, a decision in which the court protected the right to prior consultation of the Indigenous people of the Sierra Nevada in Santa Marta.

Chapter 5 presents the last two case studies of the book; this paired comparison completes the four sets. This pair of rulings has in common a lack of court-promoted monitoring mechanisms as well as the absence of legally empowered advocacy organizations. The first case study delves into the aftermath of the Chaco v. Defensor del Pueblo ruling in Argentina, where the Argentine Supreme Court sought to safeguard the rights of the Qom Indigenous group in the Chaco Province. The second case study is of T-231 1993, a ruling handed down by the Colombian Constitutional Court seeking to protect the right to a healthy environment for the inhabitants around the Bogotá Canal, in Cúcuta.

This Introductory chapter previews the main argument. I emphasize that there are two key elements in shaping judicial impact for structural cases: the oversight mechanisms that some high courts deploy to monitor compliance with their structural rulings and the advocacy organizations that mobilize in the aftermath of these rulings. The chapter also presents the book’s three main contributions: First, a careful dissection of post-ruling politics uncovers the mechanisms that create impact. Second, through a comparative study of monitoring tools, the book contributes to our understanding of how judicial power is constructed in the Global South. Third, it shows that these courts do not necessarily displace democratic politics, or elected policymakers; instead, they can create new political spaces devoted to special problems.

The New Natural Law Theory (NNLT) identifies the foundations of ethics in practical principles directing agents to aspects of human flourishing in an all-round reasonable manner. Other normative principles and concepts, including the concept of human rights, are understood in terms of their relationship to human flourishing, and the basic human goods that are constitutive aspects of that flourishing. NNLT thus possesses resources to explain the justification and importance of human rights, as well as the role rights talk plays in the overall economy of moral, political, and legal discourse. In this chapter, Section 2 discusses the logic of rights; Section 3 provides the general foundations for the justification of rights, both human and legal, in considerations of justice and common good. Section 4 looks at the paradigm case of human or natural rights: rights that are absolute and thus already conform to the logical structure of rights identified in Section 2. Section 5 identifies the scope of such rights as including all human beings. Section 6 addresses the relationship between human and legal rights. Finally, Section 7 addresses the metaphysical status of human rights.