A regime channel geometry can be computed using the second law of thermodynamics and the Gibbs equation which constitute the foundation of the thermodynamic method. With the use of a regime width relation, the need for a sediment transport rate relation can be obviated. This chapter discusses the thermodynamic methdology for deriving the hydraulic geometry of regime channels.

The structure of equilibrium thermodynamics, in harmony with statistical mechanics, does not contain a time asymmetry, except when it is trivially supplemented with one.

Modern science is systematic inquiry, not systematic knowledge. It cannot be defined by its method or by its metaphysics, since these are amended as inquiry progresses. The norms of science are therefore the business of science and represent empirical discoveries. Peirce’s conception of science is nontechnical and for that reason difficult: he identified it by its ’spirit’, a restless quest for concrete discovery fruitful of further discovery. Theory, then, is no longer the end of inquiry, a resting place, but is, instead, a means to further discovery. Whereas philosophical systems were meant to be coherent and comprehensive, a theory that grounds research cannot be complete and any incoherence in it is a stimulus, not a fatal flaw. But the pursuit of concrete knowledge requires specialization and an evolving network of specialists. Peirce reversed the usual deprecation of specialization: its aim is growth of a knowledge that transcends any individual consciousness.

The history of Quantum Computing and Quantum Cryptography starts with a friendship between Charles Bennett and Stephen Wiesner, two undergraduates at Brandeis University who toyed with ideas for sending information using quantum entanglement, and John Conway's Game of Life, which stimulated interest in cellular automata at MIT in the 1970s and started a generation of computer scientists wondering if the universe might be some massive computer running a simulation of reality. In 1974 MIT professor Ed Fredkin spent his yearlong sabbatical at Caltech, where he learned quantum physics from Richard Feynman while he taught Feynman about computer science. Returning to MIT, Fredkin's ideas developed into the philosophy of digital physics, which blossomed into the 1981 Conference on Physics and Computation at MIT. Feynman's keynote at the conference described how a computer based on quantum mechanics principles could compute physics simulations much faster than today's classical compu

Here, I outline the various sources of energy that different life-forms use. The most fundamental division of life from an energy perspective is that between self-feeders that can utilize non-biological forms of energy such as light (autotrophs) and those that feed on other organisms (heterotrophs). Further subdivision of the autotroph category shows that not all of these organisms conduct what can be called ordinary photosynthesis – the type that yields oxygen. Some autotrophs conduct non-oxygenic photosynthesis, while others do not use light at all, but rather utilize chemical energy of various kinds in processes that are collectively called chemosynthesis. Next, I consider the flow of energy in ecosystems and note the limitations in the efficiency of energy transfer between trophic levels, but also the limitations of the trophic-level concept itself. Finally, I note that the biosphere is a realm of decreasing entropy: processes that contribute to this decrease include evolution, embryological development, and ecological succession. The decreasing entropy of the biosphere is perfectly compatible with the second law of thermodynamics as this law only applies to closed systems.

Following the publication of the article in the journal Theology and Science, the journal received a well-reasoned critique by the physicist George Ellis, which they published in a subsequent issue of Theology and Science, along with my response, which appears here. These two essays constitute my manifesto of Enlightenment Humanism through the worldview of Scientific Naturalism and, in fact, are the cornerstone of an even larger worldview I am working on now, hinted at in the subtitle of this book, Scientific Humanism.

This essay addresses one of life’s Big Questions, and for too long theologians have had a monopoly on an answer. Unfortunately, many philosophers and scientists have punted on the question, preferring something along the lines of “the universe has no purpose – we have to create our own purposes,” which is true as far as it goes, but doesn’t go far enough. One reason for the reticence of philosophers and scientists to speak out on the matter beyond this now-clichéd reply is that they fear being accused of the “naturalistic fallacy,” or of bumping up against David Hume’s “Is-Ought” wall (which I address in Chapter 19 in this volume). This is a red herring. We need not concede any ground to theists on this (or any other) question related to meaning, morals, and values, and to that end I append to this essay my February 2018 Scientific American column titled “Alvy’s Error and the Meaning of Life,” in which I come at the question from yet another perspective, this time demonstrating why theists’ answer to the purpose question is not just misguided; it is wrong.