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This chapter considers non-state actors. It argues that only organized, not simply aggregate, groups can have a moral duty to securitize. This chapter goes on to examine relevant sub-state actors’ duties to securitize insiders and outsiders. Sub-state actors are permitted to securitize only when the state they reside in fails in its duty to deliver security. In such cases, relevant actors have a pro tanto obligation to securitize insiders; however, in situations where a quasi-social contract is established this duty evolves into an overriding duty. Outsiders are not – unlike in all the other chapters of this book – people in other states, but rather people not represented by the sub-state actor. Here, a pro tanto obligation to securitize outsiders is largely based on capacity.
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