Complex governance aptly describes the nascent regulation of military and security services where a set of multi-stakeholder initiatives link action by national and international hierarchies with markets and networks around a common agenda. The regulation of small arms, however, follows more traditional forms – national hierarchies act with little coordination via one another, diametrically opposed networks battle to set the agenda, and markets are largely absent (though commercial money from arms flows through both national hierarchies and networks, market modes are not present in governance processes). Concomitant with these institutional configurations, effective governance, loosely defined as coordination of relevant actors, has progressed in military and security services but regressed in small arms. This chapter compares the evolution of governance in these two issue areas illustrating the interplay of structure and agency that yields change (or not) as well as more and less governance surrounding these two issues. It argues that while the “good enough” of complex governance may not be sufficient in some eyes, it is probably the best we can hope for and is far more likely to solve problems than forms that rely on top-down, commanding, and forceful measures alone.

Chapter 5 deals with the provision of security in areas of limited statehood. We contest the notion that areas of limited statehood are mostly violent places where civil war prevails. We analyze peacekeeping missions, military interventions from the outside, as well as externally promoted security sector reform. We find that more limited external governance fostering inclusive post-conflict peace-building and security sector reform is more effective than comprehensive state-building efforts. We then look at the conditions under which violent non-state actors can provide public security in the territory that they control. Warlord governance tends to be rather ineffective. Rebel groups score better, particularly when they face high legitimacy needs and local communities with strong trust-based action capacity to hold them accountable. The chapter also looks at tribal groups and leaders as rather effective peace-keepers. They normally lack military enforcement capacity, but can rely on strong social norms to maintain security in communities. While “security under anarchy” is possible in areas of limited statehood, our findings cast serious doubts on whether public security governance can be sustainable in the long run, if a (state) monopoly of the use of force is not restored at some point.