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1 results

  • Choosing more aggressive commitment contracts for others than for the self

  • Craig I. Brimhall, David Tannenbaum, Eric M. VanEpps
  • Journal:
    Judgment and Decision Making / Volume 18 / 2023
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    19 April 2023, e12
    • Article
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  • Commitment contracts are a strategy for binding self-control failures, such as skipping a gym visit or breaking a dieting regime, to monetary penalties. Despite evidence that commitment contracts with stronger penalties improve self-control, they are relatively underused. Across 5 experiments, we find that decision makers are less likely to select commitment contracts with more severe penalties (i.e., anti-charity contracts) for themselves than they are for others. This self-other difference in contract choice arises because decision makers believe anti-charity contracts will be more effective for others than for themselves. Our results suggest that people recognize the potential effectiveness of using more aggressive commitment contracts to overcome self-control problems, but view themselves as an exception to that general rule.