Military comparison between Hannibal and Scipio began early, with their conversation at Ephesus, 193. First rule of generalship was: stay alive as ‘battle manager’; this had to be balanced by felt need for heroic leadership. Both learned warlike skills from relatives (Scipio grew up with three consular uncles and a consular father), but the biggest lesson was to avoid these men’s premature battle deaths. Army reforms are reviewed; Scipio’s are better attested. In logistics, both faced similar problems, but Hannibal’s isolation meant his challenges were greater. For weaponry, Hannibal had to improvise and recycle. Hannibal’s tactics were superior to Roman at the outset, but Scipio learned from his enemy. Both practised ‘Punic’ deception. Neither shone at siege or naval warfare. Hannibal’s struggle for Italian hearts and minds conflicted with his need to extract supplies. On man management, Scipio’s handling of Pleminius was a blemish. Unlike Scipio, Hannibal never faced a mutiny.

Sieges were central to the evolution of customary laws of war in early modern Europe and represented the most regularised form of warfare. They were also where civilians were most at risk of exposure to the violence of conventional war, including the phenomenon of sack. A besieging force that stormed a town had the right to put the garrison to the sword and to sack the town. Yet the long tradition of sack has been neglected by historians, only now emerging as a subject of study in its own right. This chapter explores the history of sieges, sack, and the laws of war in Western Europe over the course of the long eighteenth century (1660–1815). It highlights sieges as an important but relatively neglected place for examining changes and continuities in customary laws of war, ideals of barbarity and civility, and moral sentiment over the long eighteenth century.

This chapter explores the British sack of stormed towns from the perspective of Wellington’s command. Throughout his career, Wellington was not always consistent in how he dealt with sacks. He learnt lessons in India, but seemingly those lessons had to be learnt again in Spain. From Wellington’s perspective, the challenge was to manage and contain sack rather than prevent it entirely, something that he considered nigh on impossible. Given the centuries long tradition of plundering stormed towns, the chaotic circumstances of storming operations, and the prevailing articles of war, Wellington had only a very limited capacity to control the behaviour of his troops once beyond the breaches. Still, during the Peninsular War, as had been the case in India, a clear trend emerges: Wellington made progressively greater efforts to prevent or minimise sack plunder, with the growing encroachment of the military justice system into the space of sack itself. Moreover, Wellington cared about the welfare of civilians within besieged and stormed towns: it was not the breakdown of troop discipline alone that concerned him about sack – there was a humanity at play, too, as guarded and infrequently expressed as it was, in this most demonstrably unsentimental of soldiers.

This book is the first major study of British soldiers’ violence and restraint towards enemy combatants and civilians in the siege warfare of the Napoleonic era. Using British soldiers’ letters, diaries and memoirs, Gavin Daly compares and contrasts military practices and attitudes across sieges spanning three continents, from the Peninsular War in Spain, to India and South America. He focuses on siege rituals and laws of war, storm and sack of towns. The book challenges conventional understandings of the place and nature of sieges in the Napoleonic Wars. It encourages a rethinking of the notorious reputations of the British sacks of this period, and their place within the long-term history of customary laws of war and siege violence. Storm and Sack reveals a multi-faceted story of not only rage, enmity, plunder and atrocity but also of mercy, honour, humanity and moral outrage.

This book is the first major study of British soldiers’ violence and restraint towards enemy combatants and civilians in the siege warfare of the Napoleonic era. Using British soldiers’ letters, diaries and memoirs, Gavin Daly compares and contrasts military practices and attitudes across sieges spanning three continents, from the Peninsular War in Spain, to India and South America. He focuses on siege rituals and laws of war, storm and sack of towns. The book challenges conventional understandings of the place and nature of sieges in the Napoleonic Wars. It encourages a rethinking of the notorious reputations of the British sacks of this period, and their place within the long-term history of customary laws of war and siege violence. Storm and Sack reveals a multi-faceted story of not only rage, enmity, plunder and atrocity but also of mercy, honour, humanity and moral outrage.

This chapter spans the history of European siege warfare across the long eighteenth century, from the age of Louis XIV to the Napoleonic Wars. It lays out the key thematic groundwork and siege case studies explored in later chapters. The first half outlines the nature of ‘the siege’ as the classic form of old-regime positional warfare – its operational forms, temporal and spatial dimensions, and rituals and customary laws of war – and charts the relative historic decline of breach assaults and siege related massacres of garrisons and civilians in the eighteenth century. The second half shifts to the Revolutionary-Napoleonic era. It identifies the continuing importance of siege operations beyond their earlier high point in European military affairs; the regional and chronological shifts in sieges across the Napoleonic Wars; the nature of British siege operations in Continental Europe and the colonial sphere (India and South America); and ends with an overview of British and French sieges in the Peninsular War – the epicentre of Napoleonic siege warfare and of the storming and sack of besieged towns.

This final chapter offers analysis and reflections on law and policy and associated operational practice, that may contribute to improve protection of civilians. It discusses weaknesses in international humanitarian law, including on use of explosive weapons in populated areas, and indiscriminate weapons. It calls for more States and organisations to set specific policy on the protection of civilians so that they can define organisational objectives and direct resources and efforts accordingly. The challenges for PoC in urban settings are especially discussed. Future threats from cyber operations and Great Power conflict, and the protection of the environment are challenges on the horizon.

This chapter considers the experience of war from two perspectives. The first half examines the problem of literary topoi in ancient descriptions of battle and some of the ways in which scholars have tried to make sense of them. Debate about the dynamics of battle is discussed, together with the ‘face of battle’ approach. Attention is given to controversies over the application of conclusions from modern contexts about ‘ratio of fire’ and small-group cohesion. The application of ‘non-linear’ models is also considered apropos the unpredictability of battle. Finally, the battle of Busta Gallorum (43 BC) provides an intriguing case study of a battle for which, unusually, an eyewitness account has been preserved. The second half focuses on civilian experiences of war, especially in the context of sieges. Civilian involvement in the defence of cities is examined, as is the impact of food shortages, famine and disease, together with the sexual violence and enslavement that typically followed the capture of a besieged city. The impacts of raiding and of protracted wars are also considered. Late Roman evidence is particularly illuminating for the experiences of those enslaved through war.

Although there has been a tendency in modern scholarship on the Roman Empire in late antiquity (early third to early seventh century BCE) to view the period through the lens of transformation rather than violent upheaval, warfare undoubtedly became more frequent, at least compared with the first two centuries BCE, and impacted on regions of the empire long insulated from significant military conflict. The empire of late antiquity faced more significant external challenges, as well as more regular bouts of civil war. Increased use of archery, with its potential to inflict mass casualties, was a distinctive feature of battle in this period; siege warfare became more common, so that civilian populations experienced the violence of war more directly; and expansion in the size of the army placed increased pressures on recruitment and logistical support – pressures which resulted in greater use of force by the state to maintain the military establishment. Changes in the structure of the army also meant that troops were more frequently billeted on the civilian population, who thereby became more exposed to casual violence at the hands of their own troops. In these different ways, late antiquity can be considered a period of Roman history when military violence became more prevalent.