In this paper, we present empirical research on what we call ‘digital worker feedback infrastructures’ (DWFI); these are communication systems based on digital technologies that allow for creating so-called ‘feedback data’ via different forms of information input of workers in global value chains (GVC). The paper provides an overview of over 50 current DWFIs in GVCs and asks about the main differences between management-oriented and worker-centred digital feedback infrastructures in their usage of worker data. In the first part, we trace the emergence of DWFIs at the intersection of different trends: the continuous non-improvement of working conditions through auditing, the permanent politicisation, and contestation of this fact through labour and activist networks as well as the development of new digital technologies. In the second section, we elaborate the main features of DWFIs and analyse potential shortcomings in the context of the ‘ethical’ audit and monitoring regime for GVCs. Third, we use our dataset to present an overview of the heterogeneity of DWFIs. We pay particular attention to examples of civil society developed tools as we suggest that they provide a glimpse of the potential of worker feedback technologies from below, which could contribute to better monitoring of worker rights and facilitate a more democratic coordination of workplaces and GVCs.

Private safety auditors are key constituents of modern risk governance in global value chains (GVCs). However, high-impact safety incidents causing extensive harm inside and outside the chain have cast widespread doubts as to the integrity and rigour with which these commercial auditors carry out their professional services. Civil liability has been considered an important legal instrument to incentivise auditors to improve audit accuracy and integrity. Relying on English law, this article assesses the extent to which this premise holds true for product safety and social auditing. To that end, it studies the liability exposure of private safety auditors for negligent auditing in GVCs. It is argued that this exposure is primarily a function of the contractual obligations these auditors undertake to perform for producers or suppliers in GVCs. This finding draws attention to the need to better understand and define the scope of the safety audits offered for risk management purposes within GVCs.