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This paper investigates the intricate interplay between tax expenditures (TEs) and social policy. Leveraging the Global Tax Expenditures Database (GTED), we carry out the first data-driven comparative assessment of direct spending and TEs for social welfare across countries to shed light on this often-overlooked aspect of fiscal policy. Our research reveals prevalent TE usage for social purposes and substantial costs in terms of revenue forgone worldwide, averaging over 1 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 6 per cent of tax revenue. Our analysis showcases varying strategies employed by countries, particularly emphasizing the reliance of high-income economies on TEs granted through personal income taxes, and low/middle-income countries predominantly using value-added tax-related TEs for social objectives. Our results also highlight the importance of functions such as housing in contributing significantly to social spending through TEs with the ratio tax expenditure/direct spending reaching roughly 365 per cent in the US and 203 per cent in France. Hence, our study underlines the necessity for meticulous evaluation and efficient design of TEs to better align TE regimes with governments social policy objectives as well as to minimise unintended social or economic consequences.
The relationship between social policy and inequality has often been contentious in Latin America. In this context, this article analysed the relationship between social spending and income inequality in the region in the short, medium, and long run. For this purpose, data on sixteen Latin American countries in the period 1990-2017 were gathered and analysed through a panel data study. The results showed that, in line with the findings at a global level, increased levels of overall social spending are indeed associated with reduced levels of income inequality in this region. However, each one of the four main areas of social spending were observed to have different effects on income inequality. Additionally, the results showed that, despite the reforms and the increases in budgets, the social protection and social services systems still have problems reaching those at the bottom of the income distribution in the region.
In the last three decades, many Asian democracies have decentralized their political systems to promote the democratic, equal, and efficient distribution of national resources across regions. Nonetheless, most of these countries, including South Korea, are still in a stage of “partial fiscal decentralization,” in which locally elected officials have spending authority, while a significant portion of their financing relies on transfers from the central government. This article argues that the decentralized distribution is significantly influenced by the partisan interests of central and local governments. The central government transfers more funds to local governments that their co-partisans govern, and local incumbents follow partisan policy priorities to obtain the allocation of available fiscal resources. This argument is strongly supported by the empirical analysis of subsidy transfers and regional social expenditures in South Korea from 2002 to 2015. First, we find that the central government in Korea transfers larger subsidies to politically aligned regions. Second, regional governments with larger subsidy transfers have higher levels of social expenditures. Third, governors or mayors affiliated with a progressive party spend significantly more on social welfare and education than do those affiliated with a conservative party.
Social policy research examining citizens’ welfare knowledge, which offers a gateway to their understanding of the policy context, has remained limited. Adapting the opportunity–motivation–ability framework borrowed from the literature on political knowledge to welfare knowledge, this article offers an analysis of new data from a nationwide survey to explore Turkish society’s knowledge of the composition of public social spending. Corroborating earlier findings in the literature, the article maintains that most people in Turkey overestimate the relative size of social assistance spending for the poor. However, different from previous findings, the majority and most pensioners are also ill-informed about the rank of public spending on old-age pensions, the most widely used social benefit absorbing the largest share of welfare spending. The article provides evidence of the social division of welfare knowledge in Turkish society based mostly on three opportunity-related variables: city of residence, gender and income.
Other regions are indeed following paths that diverge from the route taken by the industrialized leaders over the last two centuries. In terms of the overall effort to spending tax money on social programs, both for social insurance and for public education, while the later-developing regions have spent lower shares of GDP than do the leading rich countries today, they pay higher tax shares for social spending than did the leaders did at the same levels of real income in the past. Fifty years from now, social spending will well take more than twenty percent of GDP in Japan and many countries of Eastern Europe, and even North America. Yet elsewhere many countries, some with low social spending and some with high, appear to be making wrong choices within their social budgets. This criticism applies especially to India, Turkey, Greece, Latin America, and other nations within the global South. These countries generally have lower PISA scores, lower GDP per person, and higher inequality to show for it.
Larger social spending budgets have not produced any net loss of GDP, or in skills, or in work. Without any such costs, Europe’s welfare states have produced greater equality, cleaner government, and even longer life. So says the international evidence for any decade or combination of decades back to 1880, before which there was little social spending at all. The belief that greater social spending must somehow shrink the size of the economic pie is in trouble, and is likely to keep retreating in the wake of the slump of 2020.
Since 1914 rich countries have shifted their social spending missions, away from anti-poverty policies and mass schooling and toward subsidies to the elderly. Over r4ecent generations, this mission shift has probably compromised both income equality and income growth. The global mission shift toward public pensions may have been due in large part to improvements in life expectancy, which allowed longer life past work and contributed to political “gray power.” The inference about gray power springs from the fact that public pension spending rose even per elderly person, and not just at the rate of population aging. Its per-person generosity rose faster than the rise in educational spending per child of school age. The rising demand for government pensions was probably linked, in addition, to a quiet global change in the role of intra-family transfers. Career and family developments may have raised public pressure for more government support of the elderly.
Human societies have always needed safety nets to catch those who end up in need. The risks have always been there. Only recently has there been a global surge in government social spending. The major historical issues raised by this long delay are introduced in this chapter. Readers are given spoiler alerts about whether it had to be government that spread the nets, and about whether large-spending countries got the mix of social spending wrong more often than did low-spending governments. The conventional arguments for and against tax-based social spending are introduced.
Immigration surges have complex economic effects, and nationalist backlash has complex effects on social policy. The economic and fiscal effects of immigration are mixed in the short run, though clearly positive over the generations. There are four policy options relating to immigration and social safety nets: keeping immigration free, stopping it, discriminating again immigrants in entitlements, and selectivity in immigration. Chapter 11 weighs the political likelihoods.
The history of the composition of government spending is both complex and fascinating. Although government priorities have changed over the past 150 years, social spending has been the biggest ‘winner’. In the late nineteenth century, public spending focussed on public administration, investment, debt service and the military. In the following decades until about 1960, such growth focussed on developing public services and social safety nets, taking advantage of falling military spending after the two world wars. The following sixty years saw mostly further increases in social expenditure, especially on pensions, health and long-term care. Public spending on ‘goods and services’ has always averaged nearly half of total expenditure. By contrast, social expenditure has grown from less than 10% a century ago to 55% in 2017. Education spending has been stable at about 10% of total spending in recent decades, after rising strongly in earlier years. The share of public investment has been falling steadily, from 20% in the late nineteenth century to only 7% in 2017.
In the past decades, governments significantly expanded their ‘insurance’ role in the economy. The ‘all-insurance’ state today is expected to cover almost all risks and contingencies from social security, via protecting certain industries or the financial sector to supporting demand and mitigating international crises.Social expenditure reflects the most important ‘insurance role’ of government. Social expenditure has been on a continuous upward trend for decades and absorbed 24% of GDP on average in 2016. Projections for the coming decades point to further moderate increases in an optimistic scenario and very adverse dynamics with spending growing to well above 30% of GDP in pessimistic ones.Large additional social expenditure increases would be hard to finance and would crowd out other, productive spending. Such a world of ‘social dominance’ would not be stable and sustainable. Fortunately, we have all the policy levers to prevent it.
This chapter concludes by considering the four main themes of the book: 1) How public spending has evolved over time, initially focussing on sound rules of the game and essential public goods and services before shifting more and more to welfare spending while debt grew to record levels.2) The huge differences in government performance and efficiency, the reinvigorating role of expenditure reforms and the pragmatic ‘optimal’ size of government, that does not require public spending of more than 30–35%, perhaps 40% of GDP.3) The main fiscal risks in the social and financial sphere from an ever-growing ‘insurance role’ of the state, which has contributed to rising debt and could put stability and sustainability at risk. 4) The case for strong rules and institutions to contain public spending, debt and fiscal–financial vulnerabilities. If governments focus on their core tasks and do them well, they underpin a well-functioning market economy with prosperity, freedom, opportunity and trust. This is the message of the social market economy model and it holds for the challenges related to the Coronavirus crisis which had broken out when this book went into publication. Not heeding this message in the past has contributed to governments being over-burdened and over-indebted today. We will all benefit from a lean, efficient and sustainable state.
The theories and evidence about relationships between democracy and social spending in Latin America are highly contested. A recent study shows that collective protest by organized labor effectively increases social security and welfare spending, whereas mass protest does not have comparable effects on human capital spending in Latin American democracies. This article reexamines the analysis and demonstrates that organized labor alone cannot sway democratic governments. Labor strikes require the synchronizing effect of mass protest to obtain government concessions. Only through concurrent episodes of mass protest can organized labor overcome the numerical disadvantage of pressing democratic government for social welfare spending. In understanding the relationship between labor protests and social welfare spending through the lens of insider-outsider dichotomy, it is critical to consider the synchronizing effect of mass protests. The findings remain robust with alternative measures of democracy and various model specifications.
The growing literature on individual determinants of subjective well-being has given little attention to political factors. This paper considers the welfare state, and how social expenditure affects individuals’ self-reported life satisfaction. The statistical analysis uses indicators of subjective well-being, reflecting individuals from OECD-countries between 1980 and 2012, with data gathered from the Eurobarometer and the World Values Survey - which are analysed in comparison. The results suggest that social spending should be studied in terms of underlying branches when addressing its implications. The results find social spending to be uncorrelated with levels of subjective well-being when considered in terms of total levels. When considered as types of spending however, a majority of the elements are found to have significant impacts. The findings show mixed results among the two data sets; however, important similarities are found in the way social spending related to health care and poverty are having positive impacts, and spending associated with unemployment and labour market programmes have negative impacts. As the correlations of the underlying elements affect life satisfaction in different directions, total social spending appears to be uncorrelated with subjective well-being, although the true impact depends on which socialpolicies are being promoted through such spending.
Because they are now members of most Western European parliaments, Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) have the potential to influence the formulation of socio-economic policies. However, scholarly attention so far has nearly exclusively focussed on the impact of PRRPs on what is considered their ‘core issue’, that is migration policy. In this paper, we provide the first mixed methods comparative study of the impact of PRRPs on redistributive and (de-)regulative economic policies. Combining quantitative data with qualitative case studies, our results show that the participation of PRRPs in right-wing governments has noteworthy implications for socio-economic policies. Due to the heterogeneous constituencies of PRRPs, these parties not only refrain from welfare state retrenchment but are also less inclined to engage in deregulation compared with right-wing governments without PRRP participation.
There is a large body of research showing that the provision of social policies is higher under proportional electoral systems than under majoritarian systems. This article helps advance this literature by showing that the geographic distribution of social recipients plays an essential role in moderating the impact of electoral institutions on social provision. Using data from twenty-two OECD countries, the results show that majoritarian systems increase the provision of social spending when recipients are concentrated in certain regions. When levels of concentration are high, social spending in majoritarian countries can surpass levels of provision in proportional representation systems.
Research shows that trade openness and high social spending go hand in hand, at least in wealthy democracies. It is not clear, however, exactly why this is so. Many scholars and policymakers argue that generous social spending facilitates trade liberalization, but there is no direct empirical support for this claim. This paper is the first to show directly that social spending promotes freer trade. Specifically, I show that U.S. state-level unemployment insurance makes Congress members significantly more likely to vote for freer trade. Since state unemployment insurance is exogenous to individual congressional votes, my analysis shows clearly that the former affects the latter. My results imply that social spending insures not only citizens but also open trade policies against hard economic times. They also highlight the importance of subnational policy choices to national policy outcomes.
As part of the institutional changes in Turkey since the 1980s that laid down the foundations of a market economy, the transformation of the social security system has recently come on the agenda. This article discusses the possible outcome of this transformation by situating the case of Turkey in the context of the contemporary international social policy environment shaped by neo-liberal globalization.
It is possible to suggest that throughout the world a new system of welfare governance has recently emerged, which is characterized, first, by a novel emphasis on workfare as opposed to welfare. It modifies, second, redistributive action by the state through diverse partnerships between the state, private sector and voluntary initiatives in the provision of social care and public services. The impact of this new system of welfare governance on social policy is especially important in less developed countries where the role of the state in welfare provision is recently being taken more seriously. With the new emphasis on workfare accompanied by the increasing role of non-state actors, the newly introduced social policy measures might not necessarily consolidate the basis of citizenship rights but they might mainly serve to keep under control the socio-economic insecurity aggravated by the expansion of market relations. This observation is of particular significance for the analysis of the contemporary social policy environment in Turkey that this article presents.
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