This chapter begins by surveying the historical and institutional background to the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s establishment, the jurisdiction of the Court, and how the Court has exercised that jurisdiction). It then delves into the ways in which the Court has shaped Indonesia’s electoral systems, primarily through its decisions in constitutional challenges to candidacy and seat allocation processes.

There is a duty upon every State to exercise due diligence to seek to prevent and address both extreme poverty and starvation. Intentionally inflicting starvation upon a person or group of individuals, for example by provoking a famine, will violate the right to freedom from cruel or inhuman treatment as well as the right to food; it may also violate the right to life, in particular – but not only – if a person dies as a result. 13.19 The related issues of poverty and starvation have been addressed to varying extents in the interpretation and application of regional instruments. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have been especially prominent in this regard, with the Court’s judgments in the Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa, and Xákmok Kásek indigenous communities cases being especially influential. International humanitarian law does not address poverty as such but it does prohibit deliberate starvation of civilians as a method of warfare in any armed conflict and further requires that all detainees be treated humanely, including through the provision of adequate food and water.

International cooperation finds application in a wide variety of domains, including peace and security, human rights, international economic relations, development and many others. This chapter considers the provision for international cooperation under specific treaty regimes as well as in the context of particular rights. Given the cross-cutting nature of international cooperation, the aim is to provide an insight into the way international cooperation can operate in practice to establish altruistic legal relationships as well as create regulatory spaces for altruistic behaviour.

It seems easy to assert that every human being is entitled to food security. Besides article 11 of the International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights (ICESCR), a plethora of international documents contain authoritative statements to this effect. Yet, the evolution of right to food (RTF) into a justiciable right at the national level has been met with several challenges. Even in cases where this right has been guaranteed in the constitution, one has to admit that there are neither efficient mechanisms to ensure its effective operationalisation nor clear steps to be followed by the state for its fulfilment. In the case of South Africa, the RTF is generally recognised as a fundamental right. Nevertheless, over the last two decades this right has not been translated into a well-defined entitlement with corresponding state responsibility. The chapter concludes by recommending that in light of the prevalent food insecurity at the household and individual levels, it is imperative that (quasi)judicial bodies adopt a creative interpretation of the Constitution and relevant international instruments to hold the state accountable for breaching section 27 of the Constitution and the ICESCR.

Arthur Chaskalson was appointed by President Nelson Mandela in 1994 as the first head of the newly created Constitutional Court of South Africa. As a consequence of his distinguished record as a leading human rights practitioner during the dark days of apartheid, he brought both moral and intellectual stature to the leadership of the new apex Court. During the decade of his leadership, the Court fashioned a coherent body of jurisprudence that gave meaningful content to a constitutional text that was passed into law in 1996. He was the social leader of the Court, ensuring that it became a cohesive and efficient institution for the vindication of constitutional rights. At the same time, from its inception, he was the intellectual leader of the Court. This was first evident in his judgment in S v Makwanyane (1995) in which he developed a new legal paradigm for constitutional adjudication in a decision that declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional.