In the fifth chapter it is shown how the esoteric feeds into the Russian sophianic version of theosis, as expressed by Soloviev, Florensky, and the early Bulgakov, through the spirituality of the Philokalia in its Slavonic and Russian versions and the thinking of Boehme, Steiner, and others, while at the same time the patristic teaching on deification is retrieved through the important work of Ivan Popov.

The first commonly held thesis that prevents solving the Conjunctive Problem is the Divergence Thesis, according to which Aristotle thinks that it is possible to possess theoretical wisdom and reliably manifest it in contemplation without possessing practical wisdom and reliably manifesting it in ethically virtuous activities. This thesis, though widely endorsed on the basis of a single passage, is false. The apparent support provided by that passage fades away on closer inspection. Once freed from the restrictive grip of the usual interpretation, we are prepared to understand Aristotles distinctive account of the motivations of intellectually virtuous agents. His account invites us to revisit assumptions about what the ideal epistemic agent looks like that have figured prominently in recent experimental philosophy.

I describes four kinds of knowledge and associate each with distinctive projects. What we generally refer to as positivist IR aspires to what Aristotle calls episteme: scientific knowledge that can be expressed mathematically. Interpretivist approaches aspire to phroēesis, which is best understood as practical knowledge that helps us cope with the world. This distinction cuts across paradigms and is a far more fundamental division.