The main purpose of the present study was to investigate whether in natural environment, using very large physical distances, there is a trend to overconstancy for distance estimates during development. One hundred and twenty-nine children aged 5 to 13 years old and twenty-one adults (in a control group), participated as observers. The observer's task was to bisect egocentric distances, ranging from 1.0 to 296.0 m, presented in a large open field. The analyses focused on two parameters, constant errors and variable errors, such as measuring accuracy and precision, respectively. A third analysis focused on the developmental pattern of shifts in constancy as a function of age and range of distances. Constant error analysis showed that there are two relevant parameters for accuracy, age, and range of distances. For short distances, there are three developmental stages: 5-7 years, when children have unstable responses, 7-11, underconstancy, and 13 to adulthood, when accuracy is reached. For large distances, there is a two-stage development: 5-11 years, with severe underconstancy, and beyond this age, with mild underconstancy. Variable errors analyses indicate that precision is noted for 7 year-old children, independently of the range of distances. The constancy analyses indicated that there is a shift from constancy (or slightly overconstancy) to underconstancy as a function of physical distance for all age groups. The age difference is noted in the magnitude of underconstancy that occurs in larger distances, where adults presented lower levels of underconstancy than children. The present data were interpreted as due to a developmental change in cognitive processing rather than to changes in visual space perception.

Visual motion is used to control direction and speed of self-motion and time-to-contact with an obstacle. In earlier work, we found that human subjects can discriminate between the distances of different visually simulated self-motions in a virtual scene. Distance indication in terms of an exocentric interval adjustment task, however, revealed linear correlation between perceived and indicated distances but with a profound distance underestimation. One possible explanation for this underestimation is the perception of visual space in virtual environments. Humans perceive visual space in natural scenes as curved, and distances are increasingly underestimated with increasing distance from the observer. Such spatial compression may also exist in our virtual environment. We therefore surveyed perceived visual space in a static virtual scene. We asked observers to compare two horizontal depth intervals, similar to experiments performed in natural space. Subjects had to indicate the size of one depth interval relative to a second interval. Our observers perceived visual space in the virtual environment as compressed, similar to the perception found in natural scenes. However, the nonlinear depth function we found can not explain the observed distance underestimation of visual simulated self-motions in the same environment.

We present a model for several early stages of the sensorimotor transformations involved in targeted arm movement. In psychophysical experiments, human subjects pointed to the remembered locations of randomly placed targets in three-dimensional space. They made consistent errors in distance, and from these errors stages in the sensorimotor transformation were deduced. When subjects attempted to move the right index finger to a virtual target they consistently undershot the distance of the more distal targets. Other experiments indicated that the error was in the sensorimotor transformation rather than in the perception of distance. The error was most consistent when evaluated using a spherical coordinate system based at the right shoulder, indicating that the neural representation of target parameters is transformed from a retinocentric representation to a shoulder-centered representation. According to the model, the error in distance results from the neural implementation of a linear approximation in the algorithm to transform shoulder-centered target parameters into a set of arm orientations appropriate for placing the finger on the target. The transformation to final arm orientations places visually derived information into a frame of reference where it can readily be combined with kinesthetically derived information about initial arm orientations. The combination of these representations of initial and final arm orientations could give rise to the representation of movement direction recorded in the motor cortex by Georgopoulos and his colleagues. Later stages, such as the transformation from kinematic (position) to dynamic (force) parameters, or to levels of muscle activation, are beyond the scope of the present model.

Functional specialization in the lower and upper visual fields in humans is analyzed in relation to the origins of the primate visual system. Processing differences between the vertical hemifields are related to the distinction between near (peripersonal) and far (extrapersonal) space, which are biased toward the lower and upper visual fields, respectively. Nonlinear/global processing is required in the lower visual field in order to pergeive the optically degraded and diplopic images in near vision, whereas objects in far vision are searched for and recognized primarily using linear/local perceptual mechanisms. The functional differences between near and far visual space are correlated with their disproportionate representations in the dorsal and ventral divisions of visual association cortex, respectively, and in the magnocellular and parvocellular pathways that project to them. Advances in far visual capabilities and forelimb manipulatory skills may have led to a significant enhancement of these functional specializations.

The posterior parietal cortex (PPC) is the most likely site where egocentric spatial relationships are represented in the brain. PPC cells receive visual, auditory, somaesthetic, and vestibular sensory inputs; oculomotor, head, limb, and body motor signals; and strong motivational projections from the limbic system. Their discharge increases not only when an animal moves towards a sensory target, but also when it directs its attention to it. PPC lesions have the opposite effect: sensory inattention and neglect. The PPC does not seem to contain a “map” of the location of objects in space but a distributed neural network for transforming one set of sensory vectors into other sensory reference frames or into various motor coordinate systems. Which set of transformation rules is used probably depends on attention, which selectively enhances the synapses needed for making a particular sensory comparison or aiming a particular movement.

Without disputing the experimental evidence that subjects have available most of the content of brief displays for a fraction of a second, or that visual stimuli Persist after their physical termination for a similar time, I argue that this evidence is irrelevant to perception. Specifically, the notion of an icon as a brief storage of information persisting after stimulus termination cannot possibly be useful in any typical visual information-processing task except reading in a lightning storm. Since the visual world that provides the stimuli for perception is continuous and not chopped up by tachistoscopes, and since our eyes and heads are rarely motionless, no realistic circumstances exist in which having a frozen iconic storage of information could be helpful. Rather, the presence of such an icon interferes with perception. This paper examines instances of normal perception, and then reviews experimental evidence on temporal integration, saccadic suppression, masking, and the photoreceptor basis of visual persistence, to further demonstrate that a storage of excitation cannot be a useful device for storing information. Finally, I note that little would have to be changed in our theories of visual perception or information processing if we simply forgot all about the icon and iconic memory as an early stage of processing.

We identify two aspects of the problem of maintaining perceptual stability despite an observer's eye movements. The first, visual direction constancy, is the (egocentric) stability of apparent positions of objects in the visual world relative to the perceiver. The second, visual position constancy, is the (exocentric) stability of positions of objects relative to each other. We analyze the constancy of visual direction despite saccadic eye movements.

Three information sources have been proposed to enable the visual system to achieve stability: the structure of the visual field, proprioceptive inflow, and a copy of neural efference or outflow to the extraocular muscles. None of these sources by itself provides adequate information to achieve visual direction constancy; present evidence indicates that all three are used.

Our final question concerns how information processing operations result in a stable world. The three traditionally suggested means have been elimination, translation, or evaluation. All are rejected. From a review of the physiological and psychological evidence we conclude that no subtraction, compensation, or evaluation need take place. The problem for which these solutions were developed turns out to be a false one. We propose a “calibration” solution: correct spatiotopic positions are calculated anew for each fixation. Inflow, outflow, and retinal sources are used in this calculation: saccadic suppression of displacement bridges the errors between these sources and the actual extent of movement.

This paper examines the contribution of cross-cultural studies to our understanding of the perception and representation of space. A cross-cultural survey of the basic difficulties in understanding pictures—ranging from the failure to recognise a picture as a representation to the inability to recognise the object represented in the picture— indicates that similar difficulties occur in pictorial and nonpictorial cultrues. The experimental work on pictorial space derives from two distinct traditions: the study of picture perception in “remote” populations and the study of the perceptual illusions. A comprison of the findings on pictorial space perception with those on real space perceptual illusions. A comparison of findings on pictorial space perception with those on real space perception and perceptual constancy suggersts that cross-cultural differences in the perception of both real and representational space involve two different types of skills: those related exclusively to either real space or representational space, and those related to both. Different cultural groups use different skills to perform the same perceptual tasks.

Lateralized spatial biases after brain damage are commonly assessed using batteries of paper-and-pencil tests. These tests hardly allow quantification of performance in different locations in space, and they tend to lose sensitivity along the course of recovery. We tested the dynamic Starry Night Test (SNT), a novel computerized test measuring reaction time and detection accuracy for visual target stimuli in a dynamic background, in 32 inpatients with right hemisphere stroke (RHS), 16 patients with left hemisphere stroke (LHS), and 9 healthy controls. As a group, only the RHS patients were significantly slower to respond to contralesional targets. Individually, 21 (66%) RHS patients and 5 (31%) LHS patients showed statistically significant contralateral deficits. In a number of RHS patients the SNT was more sensitive to the ipsilesional bias of spatial attention than the Behavioral Inattention Test (BIT), a standardized paper-and-pencil test battery of unilateral spatial neglect. Two illustrative case reports show that the dynamic SNT, but not the BIT, was sensitive to the spatial deficit in recovered patients, one of whom was involved in repeated car accidents. The SNT overcomes serious shortcomings of paper-and-pencil tests of unilateral neglect. It provides a simple quantitative tool for monitoring the natural and treatment-induced recovery of patients. (JINS, 2005, 11, 697–707.)Part of the data was presented in abstract form at the EBBS EuroConference on Cognitive and Neural Bases of Spatial Neglect, September 14–17, 2000, Como, Italy.

The two contrasting theoretical approaches to visual perception, the constructivist and the ecological, are briefly presented and illustrated through their analyses of space and size perception. Earlier calls for their reconciliation and unification are reviewed. Neurophysiological, neuropsychological, and psychophysical evidence for the existence of two quite distinct visual systems, the ventral and the dorsal, is presented. These two perceptual systems differ in their functions; the ventral system's central function is that of identification, while the dorsal system is mainly engaged in the visual control of motor behavior. The strong parallels between the ecological approach and the functioning of the dorsal system, and between the constructivist approach and the functioning of the ventral system are noted. It is also shown that the experimental paradigms used by the proponents of these two approaches match the functions of the respective visual systems. A dual-process approach to visual perception emerges from this analysis, with the ecological-dorsal process transpiring mainly without conscious awareness, while the constructivist-ventral process is normally conscious. Some implications of this dual-process approach to visual-perceptual phenomena are presented, with emphasis on space perception.