This chapter examines trade rules and practices regarding technical standards on energy efficiency, carbon emissions and renewable energy. Such standards usually complement anti-pollution, decarbonization and subsidization measures discussed in the previous chapters. The active use and trade implications of these measures in the energy–environment context have intensified the pace of raising related trade concerns in the WTO. Often tensions arise because of regulatory divergence that stems from differences in domestic situations, conditions and preferences as reflected in national standardization policies. But the notion that regulatory convergence is important in cutting trade costs is widely recognized, with many jurisdictions being increasingly involved in regulatory cooperation. Clean energy products can be supplied together with the associated services. Yet international trade rules on service standards are nearly under-developed and lack substantive details, which gives leeway to national regulators. Besides ‘general’ markets, green goods and services find their use in the segment of government procurement where environmental aspects are made part of technical specifications.

This chapter provides a unique account of the content of discussions in SPS and TBT Committees. Based on an in-depth analysis of Committee meeting minutes over 5 years (2010–2014), it looks into the demand side of information, i.e. in the information sought by WTO Members raising a concern in the SPS and TBT Committees and their purpose in raising such concerns. It finds that Members active in the STC discussions are either after further information or clarification of a measure, they intend to influence draft regulations through inputs to other Members’ regulatory process, or they try to address a problem they face in the implementation of the measure. STCs therefore allow WTO Members to engage in technical dialogue about domestic regulations, against the backdrop of the SPS and TBT Agreements, without there being a legal stake in the discussion. In other words, transparency can be seen as shaping the behaviour of WTO Members without there being new agreements or enforcement.

Chapter 4 shows the information that is made available to WTO Members through transparency in the SPS and TBT context – the ‘supply side’ of information. In this regard it presents information made available through notifications, bilateral and multilateral regulatory dialogue, through dialogue with the private sector. The SPS and TBT Agreements enable Members to obtain a considerable volume of information on each others’ domestic measures. The high volume of information about SPS and TBT measures shows that the transparency tools are made use of substantively. Information, however, remains limited on whether this information matches the information needs. The main indication in this regard, i.e. the STC discussions, suggests that Members still have a high demand for further information including about measures that have not been notified, and therefore the overall level of disclosure of SPS and TBT measures remains insufficient.

Chapter 6 compares specific trade concerns and dispute settlement, demonstrating that both fora are used in a complementary manner, mostly one after the other or in parallel. This is true looking at all requests for consultations that mention the SPS and TBT Agreements, but even more so when the main subject matter of the dispute is the SPS or TBT Agreement. Generally speaking, STCs serve as a forum for dialogue to reach a common understanding of WTO compliant measures, whereas formal disputes are raised when agreement cannot be reached and a clear and authoritative interpretation is needed from a third party. All country groups tend to participate in both fora, while developing countries are most active in trying to first solve an issue through an STC before going to dispute settlement. Overall, through an empirical study of WTO Member practice, this chapter confirms the importance of regulatory co-operation between WTO Members for the effective implementation of the SPS and TBT Agreements.

After having seen both the potential effects of transparency under the SPS and TBT framework and the limitations that still remain as to their actual benefits to all Members, Chapter 9 will examine the main ways forward to improve the system. These recommendations focus on what the WTO Members on the one hand and the WTO Secretariat on the other can do to improve the effectiveness of transparency, with the ultimate goal of improving the day-to-day implementation of the SPS and TBT Agreements, preventing disputes or allowing better disputes if they must take place. The recommendations are structured around improving availability of information on all Members’ domestic regulations, to all Members and to private stakeholders and on enhancing the scope and benefits of regulatory co-operation.

Part III shows that even for trade conflicts that do not get solved in bilateral or multilateral dialogue, transparency is still an essential ‘complement’ to dispute settlement: transparency is often used in addition to formal dispute settlement procedures, either before, in parallel or after the proceedings have finished. Indeed, the SPS and TBT transparency mechanisms facilitate access to information and foster dialogue for all Members alike, thus providing equal access to understanding about domestic factual and legislative contexts behind trade frictions. If tensions persist, transparency can support Members in having the necessary information to raise and defend disputes. In parallel, discussions in STCs at the margins of formal dispute settlement can continue to serve as a basis for Members to work towards a mutually acceptable solution.