There is little value in affirming the existence of the right to victims of armed conflict to reparation if it is not clear how massive numbers of victims could access to reparation. The chapter shows how accessibility is essential for guaranteeing this right, offering concrete proposals. As human rights law is an important tool for determining the existence of this right, experiences implementing massive forms of reparation for victims of human rights violations also serve to determine its operationalization. This requires adapting basic notions about the right to reparation designed for addressing individual claims to situations where individualized methods for determining rights will result on the exclusion of the vast majority of victims. The chapter examines the experiences of the UN Compensation Commission and the Ethiopia-Eritrea Compensation Commission, as well as of reparations programs implemented in Guatemala, Peru, Sierra Leone, Colombia, and Chile. It analyses how these policies determined the violations to cover, reparation measures, registering victims, and guaranteeing accessibility of vulnerable victims, women and those frequently excluded. These experiences offer criteria for interpreting notions of proportionality, restitutio in integrum, compensation, and standards of evidence, as well as the relationship with judicial reparation, reconstruction, and development in post conflict situations.

A growing number of states have started pointing to the customary doctrine of countermeasures as the most feasible unilateral remedy in the case of a malicious cyber operation carried out by an adversarial actor. Thus, the legal requirements of successfully invoking a right to resort to countermeasures are analysed in depth. In particular, the chapter deals with state policies such as 'active cyber defences' and 'hacking back' as reactions to cybersecurity incidents, and their lawfulness as countermeasures. After examining the pervasive problem of attribution in cyberspace, the states' duty to prevent malicious cyber operations emanating from their territory and the standard of due diligence in this regard are investigated. The chapter concludes with considering the invocation of countermeasures for the purpose of guarantees of non-repetition and reparation in the aftermath of a cybersecurity incident.

This chapter analyses the preconditions of invoking self-defence against a malicious cyber operation. After examining the notion of 'armed attack' and under what circumstances a cybersecurity incident may reach the critical threshold, the study focuses on the question of attributing the malicious conduct to a state actor. Depending first on identifying the acting individual whose hacking then needs to be linked to a state via the rules enshrined in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, the question of the applicable standard of evidence is analysed in detail. Concluding that the technical peculiarities of cyberspace will often prevent states from presenting a sufficient amount of proof of adversarial state involvement in a timely manner, the chapter exposes the inherent difficulties in connection with the doctrine of self-defence in cyberspace.