Modern interactions between humans and robots challenge our conceptions of self, privacy, and society, stretching the capacities of legal regimes to preserve autonomy, intimacy, and democratic governance. Where should we look for normative and legal guidance? One possibility in the US context is the Fourth Amendment. Unfortunately, rules governing “standing” and the state agency requirement limit the Amendment’s potential to protect core norms in these rapidly evolving contexts. This chapter argues that the text, history, and philosophical lineage of the Fourth Amendment favor a broader understanding of who can bring Fourth Amendment challenges and whose conduct should be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation. This reading dramatically enhances the Amendment’s role in efforts to understand, regulate, and protect human–robot interactions.

This chapter charts the most recent history of the private criminal justice system, from its lowest point of influence in the 1960s to modern times, when private police outnumber their public counterparts by almost a two-to-one margin. It also notes that private police are distinctive not just because of their sheer number but because of the goals that they seek to achieve – which are essentially the goals of the client who is paying them or the goals of the neighborhood or volunteer associaton that they represent. The chapter examines not only paid private police but also volunteer private police, such as the Guardian Angels, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy, neighborhood watch programs, and “white hat” hackers.The chapter concludes by pointing out the relatively low level of regulation that applies to private police and by examining the pros and cons of using private police to detect and apprehend criminals.

Argued December 14, 1970.Decided June 14, 1971.

Justice BODDIE delivered the opinion of the Court.1

This case arises out of Jackson, Mississippi’s decision to close its public swimming pools rather than integrate them. At issue is whether these closures violate the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, thereby requiring an order enjoining the pools to be reopened. City officials deny that the closures constitute a badge of slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment. They similarly insist that the closures do not violate equal protection because they apply equally to blacks and to whites such that neither group has the benefit of using any municipal pools.

This chapter considers the ‘expanding the state model’ which limits the obligations flowing from fundamental rights to the state and only imposes obligations on non-state actors if they are, in some sense, state-like. This model fundamentally raises the question of what constitutes part of the state and, in so doing, provides an understanding of the determinants for having obligations. I argue the model focuses on the wrong issue: which agents are part of the state rather than the factors that are relevant to determining obligations. The chapter also examines the model as it is expressed through the case law of three jurisdictions – the United States, Germany and South Africa. In doing so, I explore the factors the courts employ to determine whether an entity or function is state-like and their implications for obligations. Those factors overlap with those identified in the other models – which, in turn suggests, the artificiality of confining the application of rights only to state actors.

The Constitution says nothing about the presidential nominating process and has had little direct role in the evolution of that process from congressional caucuses to party national conventions to our current primary-dominated system of selecting convention delegates. Yet, constitutional law is a factor in empowering and constraining the principal actors in the nomination process and in shaping the framework for potential future changes.

The constitutional law of the presidential nomination process operates along two axes: government-party, and state-national. The government-party dimension focuses on the tension between the states and the federal government in writing the rules for and administering the electoral process—which may include the primary elections that determine the nominees of the political parties—and the right of the parties to determine how to pick their nominees. This government-party axis affects all nominations of candidates for state and federal office.