We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Chapter 6 considers how insights from legal risk management, international humanitarian law, strategic intelligence analysis and forecasting might help manage uncertainty and extra-legal biases in the jus ad bellum. The chapter proposes a framework drawing on these fields, using legal and extra-legal expertise to describe the legal and factual context, competing legal theories justifying or prohibiting force, multiple possible interpretations of current facts and future consequences of using or not using force and potential risks that any legal theory is challenged or disproven, and recommending whether to accept these risks and use force, take steps to reduce risks, or not to use force where these risks are too severe. The chapter applies this framework to the Kosovo and Afghanistan interventions, showing that the framework as applied by this author recommends more cautious decisions than those actually taken. The chapter considers how such a framework might have affected UK legal advice on the 2003 Iraq intervention. The chapter concludes that the framework may help address uncertainty and extra-legal intuitions, but does not eliminate the need for judgement, and raises significant normative questions.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.