Innovative conceptions of the soul flourished in the past century. Worcester and McComb discussed the subconscious as the soul, that unknown aspect of ourselves. The subconscious was the source of religious experience. Myers’ “subliminal self” produced automata that upsurged across the threshold of consciousness; while automata could be pathological, they could also be indicative of the future evolution of the personality. James speculated about souls beyond the individual, even of the earth itself. Jung articulated an understanding of the soul and of psychical reality. Holt recognized soul in the form of consciousness as the “cross-section.” Holt recognized form in “the wish,” as organizing consciousness and behavior. These innovations represented a shift in emphasis from the figural of mental life—consciousness—to its ground. They shifted the conversation about the soul from it being an efficient cause of mental life to it being the formal cause of mental life.

What does ‘write what you know’ mean? The bedrock of human experience is essentially the same in any age and this is part of what writers ‘know’. We bring imagination – and sometimes research – to our own experience when we write. Everything we have lived through is potentially valuable material; writing involves transforming this material. Even inspiration comes from within. The need to top up our own personal reservoir of experience. All ideas begin ‘What if…’ The importance of pushing beyond what we know we can do easily: creativity thrives when we are outside our comfort zone.

‘The magic isn’t out there somewhere, waiting to be discovered: the ingredients are in you right now, in your experience and in your imagination, waiting for you to make the unique connections that will enable you to discover it.’

The first part of this paper looks into the question of Lucretius’ philosophical sources and whether he draws almost exclusively from Epicurus himself or also from later Epicurean texts. I argue that such debates are inconclusive and likely will remain so, even if additional Epicurean texts are discovered, and that even if we were able to ascertain Lucretius’ philosophical sources, doing so would add little to our understanding of the DRN. The second part of the paper turns to a consideration of what Lucretius does with his philosophical sources. The arguments within the DRN are not original. Nonetheless, the way Lucretius presents these arguments establishes him as a distinctive philosopher. Lucretius deploys non-argumentative methods of persuasion such as appealing to emotions, redeploying powerful cultural tropes, and ridicule. These methods of persuasion do not undercut or displace reasoned argumentation. Instead, they complement it. Lucretius’ use of these methods is rooted in his understanding of human psychology, that we have been culturally conditioned to have empty desires, false beliefs and destructive emotions, ones that are often subconscious. Effective persuasion must take into account the biases, stereotypes and other psychological factors that hinder people from accepting Epicurus’ healing gospel.

The focus is on the subtle meanings of Stanislavsky’s ‘life of the human spirit’, demonstrating this idea’s seminal importance for his System and the latter’s roots in specific aspects of Russian Orthodoxy, primarily its holistic approach. The perspective offered here looks directly at Stanislavsky’s religious beliefs, which scholars either have not recognized or have avoided, and it runs counter to recent studies of the System, which promote yoga as its main influence. Key formulations intended to be of practical use to actors are shown to be integral to Stanislavsky’s worldview, which made his System far more than a matter of technique and actor training. The chapter indicates how lack of attention to his worldview, from which his religious and artistic views are inseparable, is bound up with inadequate translation into English of numbers of his principal terms.

Stanislavsky’s notion of the organic actor has Isadora Duncan’s natural dancing for reference, among others, and that of emotional experiencing is identified in respect of other types of acting central to Stanislavsky’s critique. His views on ethics and discipline are foregrounded – another neglected but indispensable facet of his worldview and of his understanding of the actor.