This chapter argues that the main arguments for substance dualism can be parodied and transformed either into arguments against substance dualism, or into arguments for the thesis that we are composite physical objects. The upshot of the chapter is that those considerations commonly thought to support substance dualism are indecisive at best, since they can be parodied. The arguments discussed include: modal arguments; an epistemic argument; the argument from the alleged fact that facts regarding personal identity outstrip the physical facts; the argument from phenomenology and intentionality; the argument from the unity of consciousness; Lowe’s argument from unity; and the argument from the problem of the many.

This chapter argues that the main arguments which lead many philosophers to reject substance dualism can be parodied and transformed into arguments against substance dualism’s main competitor, the thesis that we are composite physical objects. The upshot of the chapter is that those considerations commonly thought to undermine substance dualism are indecisive at best, since they can be parodied. The arguments discussed include: parsimony-based arguments; the argument from causal closure/exclusion; the argument from conservation laws; the argument from the correlation between mental states and brain states; arguments to the effect that souls require an implausible cutoff point, in either evolutionary history or in fetal development, before which there is no soul and after which there is a soul; and arguments to the effect that substance dualism leads to an implausible skepticism regarding our ability to reidentify people over time.

This chapter discusses a particularly important objection to substance dualism, that there is something problematic about the idea that immaterial souls can causally interact with physical bodies. This objection is best put in terms of the pairing problem for substance dualism, which claims that substance dualism is objectionable because it would result in souls and bodies being causally paired in an objectionably brute manner. I argue that those who think that we are composite physical objects face an analogous problem: the mereological pairing problem. According to the mereological pairing problem, the thesis that we are composite physical objects is objectionable because composite physical persons and their parts would be paired in an objectionably brute manner. The upshot of the chapter is that one of the most prominent objections to substance dualism is indecisive at best, since it can be parodied.