Chapter 5 offers the first comprehensive analysis of supportive military interventions by African states. Supportive interventions are those that assist the target government, a phenomenon which

States usually intervene in failed states for broader strategic or humanitarian motives. However, chapter 6 uses Somalia, the Democratic Repblic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan to show that most African interveners lent their support to one side or the other in these lawless lands in the pursuit of their own interests. In the DRC, external interveners were primarily interested in looting rather than in Congo’s stability. In Somalia, Ethiopia switched from hostile to supportive military interventions in an attempt to dampen Islamist influence while also creating a weak transitional government it could easily manipulate. Kenya and Eritrea, in contrast, intervened in order to establish a strong Somali state capable of counterbalancing Ethiopia’s hegemonic aspirations in the horn of Africa. Unlike the first two cases, South Sudan did not experience multiple military interventions despite encountering similar conditions. This negative case is the result of Ethiopia’s restraint from taking any military action to support its kin, the Nuer, because it feared upsetting the ethnic balance in its eastern region. Results from qualitative comparative analysis show that most African interveners are motivated to dispatch their militaries to failed states by the presence of prominent roles, rebel sanctuaries, lootable resources, and domestic pressures.

Chapter 3 analyzes military intervention into Africa by former colonial powers and the European Union. It shows that their supportive and neutral interventions have been much more frequent than hostile interventions. Among these powers, France has remained the most interventionist state in Africa because close ties with Francophone governments have helped to provide successive French leaders with a global status and a mission beyond Europe. Consistent with quantitative and historical treatments, qualitative comparative analysis emphasizes the impact that capabilities and national roles have had on interventions by former colonial metropoles in Africa, while the European Union has intervened into Africa for humanitarian motives. Chapter 3 also demonstrates that supportive and neutral military interventions by former colonial powers into Africa correspond with high levels of mass unrest at home. As a result, this chapter contends that many French and other colonial military interventions failed to produce stability in African polities in part because the military actions were motivated by domestic concerns. Thus, some combination of national role, capabilities, and domestic political pressures help to explain many military interventions by former colonial powers, and none of these conditions seem likely to result in operations that put African populations’ interests at the forefront.