This article focuses on the widespread practice of appointing deputy judges, called naibs, in the Ottoman Empire from the mid-eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries. Based on extensive archival research, it analyses how the judiciary turned into a system of allocating revenue sources. An increasing number of offices of kadı (judge) were assigned as a source of income to higher-ranking ulema, who, through intermediaries, in turn farmed out their judicial offices to naibs in return for a fixed sum of money. Importantly, the apportionment fees for taxes collected from local taxpayers constituted a significant part of naibs’ incomes. The practice of deputizing in the Ottoman judiciary thus shows a close parallel with tax farming. Because the naibs transferred their revenues to the higher-ranking ulema, farming out judicial offices became a major economic basis for maintaining the Ottoman ulema hierarchy.

By weaving the political economy of the Portuguese empire into business history, this article highlights the role of metropolitan and colonial tax farming in the rise and fall of an elite that dominated the business scene in both mainland Portugal and colonial Brazil between roughly 1730 and 1760. It takes the Torres family business as a case study and argues that, while tax farming undoubtedly represented an opportunity to accumulate private wealth, it was also a risky business. Adding to the irregularity of fiscal income, tax farming imposed strict rules on tax farmers, deriving from the legal framework for public finance, while the Crown's policy of seeking to maximize revenue through competitive bidding also increased the risks to which they were exposed. While being highly concentrated on tax farming in Portugal and the South Atlantic empire allowed the Torres family business to amass extraordinary wealth, it also proportionately increased the firm's exposure to those risks, which were then further compounded by a succession problem that eventually led to its demise.

This paper uses corruption in Mexico City's markets as a lens to examine state–society relations and the construction of the PRI's hegemony in post-1946 Mexico. It presents three case studies that show how some ostensibly corrupt practices supported state functioning, while others contributed to the process of party building. It demonstrates that these practices were driven by shifting social dynamics and conflicts among vendors, which operated through networks of formal and informal power. Historicising corruption illuminates the strengths and weaknesses of the Mexican state as well as the balance between co-optation and popular demands that lay behind it in this period.