There are two kinds of time bias: near bias and future bias. While philosophers typically hold that near bias is rationally impermissible, many hold that future bias is rationally permissible. Call this normative hybridism. According to arbitrariness objections, certain patterns of preference are rationally impermissible because they are arbitrary. While arbitrariness objections have been leveled against both near bias and future bias, the kind of arbitrariness in question has been different. In this article we investigate whether there are forms of arbitrariness that are common to both kinds of preferences and, hence, whether there are versions of the arbitrariness objection that are objections to both near bias and future bias. If there are, then this might go some way toward undermining normative hybridism and to defending thoroughgoing time-neutralism.

Variation in the passage of time is perceived against the backdrop of standard temporal units. Under certain conditions, we perceive time to be passing slowly. In other settings, our subjective temporal experience is roughly synchronized with the objective time of clocks or calendars. And given different circumstances, we perceive time to have passed quickly. Drawing from 740 narratives that depict distortion in the perceived passage of time, I formulate a theory that accounts for the full range of variation in temporal experience. This theory can be represented by an S-shaped figure. According to this theory, variation in the perceived passage of time reflects variation in the density of experience per standard temporal unit. In turn, the density of experience per standard temporal unit is conditioned by the dynamics of social interaction. In its original form, however, this theory assumes that one’s circumstances shape one’s temporal experience in deterministic fashion. Consequently, based upon interviews with 406 disparate people, I conceptualize time work (or temporal agency) as one’s efforts to control, manipulate, or customize one’s own temporal experience or that of others. I conclude with some directions for future research.

Human experience of temporal durations exhibits a multi-regional structure, with more or less distinct boundaries, or horizons, on the scale of physical duration. The inner horizons are imposed by perceptual thresholds for simultaneity (≈ 3 ms) and temporal order (≈ 30 ms), and are determined by the dynamical properties of the neural substrate integrating sensory information. Related to the inner horizon of experienced time are perceptual or cognitive “moments.” Comparative data on autokinetic times suggest that these moments may be relatively invariant (≈ 102 ms) across a wide range of species. Extension of the “sensible present” (≈ 3 s) defines an intermediate horizon, beyond which the generic experience of duration develops. The domain of immediate duration experience is delimited by the ultimate outer horizon at about ≈102 s, as evidenced by analysis of duration reproduction experiments (reproducibility horizon), probably determined by relaxation times of “neural accumulators.” Beyond these phenomenal horizons, time is merely cognitively (re)constructed, not actually experienced or “perceived,” a fact that is frequently ignored by contemporary time perception research. The nyocentric organization of time experience shows an interesting analogy with the egocentric organization of space, suggesting that structures of subjective space and time are derived from active motion as a common experiential basis.