This paper traces the centrality of the human face in the construction of modern individuality. It argues that the face of individuality no less than that of typology, is mired in and born of historical and political conditions that are subsequently disavowed in order that the individual (and the face she bears) is rendered a product of nature, an instantiation of the universal. Attempting to denaturalize and defamiliarize the authority invested in the face, this paper maps out three interrelated arguments: that the human face is historically produced; that its history is closely tethered to the production of modern subjectivity, and that its status as a purveyor of meaning relies upon the reiteration of preexisting norms through which it can be “read.” And yet, while this paper turns to the nineteenth century to trace the novel privileging of the face as an extension of selfhood, interwoven through this history is the figure of the “effaced” Muslim woman and the Muslim terrorist type.

During the morning rush hour on Thursday, 07 July 2005, a series of four bombs exploded, affecting London's public transport system.These terrorist attacks killed 52 people and injured >700.A majorincident was declared, and the Royal London Hospital (RLH) was a primary receiving hospital.

A total of 194 patients presented to the RLH.Twenty-seven patients required admission. A total of 11 amputations were performed on eight patients. One patient died intra-operatively.Another patient died on Day 6 due to complications related to a head injury.

Coordination is vital to the implementation of the hospital's Major Incident Plan in such an emergency. Subsequent internal reviews of the response of the RLH on 07 July 2005 highlighted problems with communication and documentation, as well as the need for extra staffing.These areas should be improved for the management of future major incidents.

The relentless modernisation of weaponry, the transformation of military strategy, and recent conflicts incorporating both these trends, especially in response to the War on Terror (WOT), raise two questions with regard to jus in bello: does the almost exponential increase in the use of modern weaponry and commensurate changes in military strategies foster compliance with jus in bello or, alternatively, does it make its observance less likely. Second, is jus in bello in danger of becoming increasingly irrelevant in the era of post-modern asymmetrical warfare. If so, can jus in bello be adapted to meet these new challenges? Answering these two questions, this article describes jus in bello, reviews how advances in weapon technology and force structure have been reflected in recent military operations, and identifies key jus in bello issues that have arisen in these recent conflicts. The article also surveys how technology and jus in bello impacted changes in US military strategy and future weapon modernisation efforts, and concludes by noting that weapon modernisation and new military strategies have proceeded within jus in bello and have fostered its observance ensuring that jus in bello will survive the unique challenges posed by non-conforming terrorists and belligerent states.

This is a descriptive study of the Emergency Medical Services response to a bombing of a United States Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on 19 April 1995. The explosion emanated from a rented truck parked in the front of the building. The force of the explosion destroyed three of the four support columns in the front of the building and resulted in a pancaking effect of the upper floors onto the lower floors.

There were three distinct phases of the medical response: 1) Immediately available local EMS ambulances and staff; 2) Additional ambulances staffed by recalled, off-duty personnel; and 3) mutual-aid ambulances and personnel from the surrounding communities. There were 361 persons in the building at the time of the explosion, 163 of these perished. Within the first hour of the explosion, 139 patients were transported to area hospitals. Of these, 32% were in critical condition. During the day of the explosion, 444 persons were treated for physical injuries: 410 of these were related to the explosion and 14, including one with fatal injuries, were sustained during search and rescue attempts. A total of 354 (80%) were treated and released from emergency departments, and 90 (20%) were admitted to hospitals. Six of the transported victims either were dead on arrival to the emergency department or died after admission to the hospital. Of those who died, 95% of the deaths were related to blunt trauma associated with the collapse of the structure. Only three persons were extricated alive after the first five hours following the explosion.

The scene became flooded with volunteers who, although their intentions were to provide help and aid to those injured, created a substantial logistical problem for Incident Command. Several other lessons were learned: 1) Telephone lines and cells became overloaded, but the Hospital Emergency Administrative Radio system was operational only in three of the 15 hospitals; 2) Volunteer personnel should have responded to the hospitals and not to the scene; and 3) Training was an essential for the success of such a response. Thus, the success of this operation was a function of the intense training, practice, and coordination between multiple agencies.