Although Kant’s view according to which our theoretical representation of nature “coheres” with our representation of nature from the perspective of our practical needs culminates with the third Critique and the notion of reflective judgment’s principle of nature’s purposiveness, this chapter demonstrates that the origins of this view can already be discerned in Kant’s discussion of nature’s systematicity in the first Critique, namely, in his discussion of the rationalist notion of the Transcendental Ideal and his account of nature as a unified system of laws in the Appendix to the Dialectic. While for some commentators reason’s need for the unconditioned is exclusively a reflection of its practical need, I argue that that the notion of the metaphysical ground of the unity of nature is a necessary notion for reason in both its theoretical and practical functions and, moreover, that reason’s practical ends are presupposed in every theoretical investigation of nature.

The book closes with a brief Postscript on Kant’s ‘practical metaphysics.’ In the Critique of Practical Reason and elsewhere, Kant introduces three ‘postulates of pure practical reason’, which concern God’s existence, freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul. We briefly discuss whether reason eventually finds in a practical mode what it had been looking for in a speculative mode, namely, the unconditioned. (The answer is: almost, but not quite.)