The charismatic Tibetan religious hierarch, the Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal unified Bhutan in the second quarter of the seventeenth century. The Zhabdrung introduced a “dual system” of secular and religious government that remained in place until the establishment of the current monarchy in 1907. Major institutional reforms implemented by the third king saw the state-sponsored Central Monk Body gain roles in the National Assembly and the Royal Advisory Council that lasted until 2008. In its transition to a democracy in 2008 Buddhism was declared to be separate from politics with monks, nuns, and lay practitioners (gomchen) prohibited from taking part in elections or voting. The chapter outlines the transformation from a theocratic “dual system” to a constitutional monarchy and the unforeseen consequences of the separation of religion and politics now emerging in Bhutan.

On January 7, 1978, Daryush Homayun, the Shah’s Information Minister, published an article in a semiofficial newspaper in which he described Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as “an adventurer, without faith, and tied to the centers of colonialism … a man with a dubious past, tied to the more superficial and reactionary colonialists.” Writing under a pseudonym that in no way disguised the regime’s authorship, Homayun accused Khomeini of accepting money from the British in return for his public attacks on the Shah’s reform program. Rioting broke out the following day in the holy city of Qom after the regime’s security forces attempted to suppress protests by theological students. Some seventy people were killed in the next two days. Thus began the Iranian Revolution.1

On the eve of victory in the 1979 revolution, Ruhollah Khomeini and his Islamists followers discussed blueprints for a new system of Islamic government. Integral to these plans was an emphasis on the new institutions of Islamic shura (local councils) to replace the secular anjumans (local associations) that existed in town and cities. The chapter details Khomeini’s call to establish elected local government in early 1979, months before the new constitution delineating the shape of the new state had been ratified, indicating the significance of the shura. I examine the tensions between the competing visions of shura within the theocratic Islamist camp, by contrasting the views of Khomeini and Mahmoud Taleghani. This chapter also discusses the aborted attempt to hold the first local government elections in the fall of 1979, a factor contributing to the new regime’s reluctance to decentralize government for another decade and a half. The chapter details the multiple and conflicting perspectives on shura during the deliberations leading to the first constitution. The ratified constitution subordinated local and national government (shura and the Majles) to the velayat-e faqih and established a settlement that shaped and constrained the future possibilities and limitations of decentralization in the ensuing decades up to the present day.

Overviews the church–state relationship across time and nations, drawing attention to countries and circumstances in which the neutrality principle does not apply. Explores the origins of the doctrine, traces its developmental history in relation to religion in various countries, explains key concepts and identifies some different academic interpretations. Discusses the public/private dimensions to religious belief and their balancing within the Western liberal democratic model of government. It gives an overview of the law relating to religious freedom.

Montesquieu assesses Roman politics, philosophy, and religion. He explains in his Dissertation on Roman Politics in Religion (1716) that the Roman republic was designed by Romulus and the early kings of Rome as a theocracy. The goal of Roman paganism was “to inspire fear of the gods in a people who feared nothing, and to make use of that fear to lead them in any way they wished.” In his Discourse on Cicero (1717) Montesquieu expresses unstinting admiration for Cicero both as a statesman and a philosopher, asserting that Cicero’s De Officiis teaches us “what is honorable and beneficial, what we owe to society, what we owe to ourselves, and what we should do as heads of families or as citizens.” In his Dialogue between Sulla and Eucrates (1724) he assesses the conduct of the Roman general and dictator Lucius Cornelius Sulla, observing that he had shown how deadly heroism can be, even when based on sound principle, such as Sulla’s desire to restore the powers of the Roman senate. “For one man to be above humanity,” Montesquieu concludes, all the others pay too dear a price.” Sulla marked out a path toward tyranny that Caesar would surely follow.