This chapter summarises the argument of the book. It has examined the EU’s competition regime and its application in times of crises. In each of these cases, the relaxation of the rules has been shown not to have assisted in solving the crises, and has exacerbated the effects of some crises. Further, as has been shown, the rules themselves do not provide an insurmountable barrier to the solution of ongoing crises (e.g. those associated with environmental and sustainability concerns). Rather, the problem is the need for competition authorities to provide additional guidance and to work with stakeholders in designing and implementing solutions. The work shows that its main lesson – that the introduction of further monopolisation into markets does not solve crises – has been established.

This chapter introduces the argument of the book. It sets out the problem, namely that in almost every crisis there are calls to relax the competition laws so that business can aid in the resolution of the crisis. This chapter challenges this claim. It does so by arguing that the aim of the competition regime is to increase social wealth, so that it can later be used or redistributed. The Introduction outlines the structure of the work, indicating what will be found in subsequent chapters.