What determines the bargaining power of states in international trade negotiations? The literature focuses predominantly on economic strength as the determinant of bargaining power. However, this explanation neglects the reality of modern trade, which is characterized by the globalization of production and high levels of economic interdependence. I argue that this interdependence undermines the effect of economic strength on the bargaining power of states. Specifically, I hypothesize that the effect of economic strength declines when a country's companies rely on inputs for their production from a negotiation partner because they are integrated into global value chains. The more a country's firms are dependent on a partner country, the less that country is able to coerce concessions from the partner country by bringing to bear its economic strength. To test this hypothesis, I use a dataset covering concessions on liberalization of the services sector made by 54 countries in 61 preferential trade agreements. By calculating the relative concessions of each partner, I construct a quantitative indicator of the outcome of trade negotiations. This indicator should reflect the underlying bargaining power of each negotiating party. The results of a regression analysis of these negotiation outcomes mostly support my hypotheses.

Domestic Investment Laws (DILs), a prominent tool of contemporary unilateral International Economic Law (IEL) in the context of the Liberal International Order (LIO), consistently provide for investment incentives as a key aspect of domestic industrial policies geared to influence investment location decisions. The various types of investment incentives include fiscal measures to attract investment, direct subsidies, and other regulatory measures aimed at creating favorable administrative and regulatory conditions for investment. This article analyzes how the provisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements contain basic disciplines and set limitations for the distortive effects of investment incentives. It is argued that the relevance of WTO law for domestic investment incentives should not be under-stated; rather, DILs providing investment incentives should be treated as a limited exception to the ongoing move from international to domestic in the era of the LIO.

Did trade patterns in services change into activities that were more digital-intense after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, and was this shift structural? This paper uses a Difference-in-Difference (DID) approach to investigate whether services trade became more digital-based after the GFC in 2008. It finds support that the GFC formed a break from the previous period that caused services trade to become more digital – although there are signs that this had already started before 2008. Countries with high internet usage and a comparative advantage in digital-intense services, such as R&D, information exchange, computer services, and charges for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), on average saw post-GFC a 6% increase in global exports compared to other non-digital sectors. More striking is that upper-middle income countries and countries with medium levels of skills also witnessed a sharp increase. These significant outcomes may indicate the direction into which patterns of services trade are likely to turn after the current economic crisis resulting from COVID-19.

After eight years of effort, the 15 Asian members involved in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) met in a virtual ceremony to sign the final document on Sunday, 15 November 2020. The final deal matches the original objective – to knit the region together and allow firms to build supply chains across the region to deliver goods, services, and investment to Asian markets more seamlessly. Getting this free trade agreement (FTA) to this point involved repeated missed deadlines, the loss of one important negotiating partner, and thousands of miles of travel for a rotating cast of officials, trade ministers, and leaders. RCEP began in late 2012 as an effort to unravel what has often been called the ‘spaghetti or noodle bowl’ of overlapping and inconsistent rules that can impede trade. While most of the countries in the region have extensive experience in trade and are outward oriented, trade in Asia has been bedeviled with challenges. This includes a range of both tariff and non-tariff obstacles that have made it more difficult than might be expected to trade, especially for final products, within the region.

This paper applies machine learning to recreate to a high degree of accuracy the OECD's Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) to provide quantitative evidence on the restrictiveness of services policies in 2016 for a sample of developing countries, using regulatory data collected by the World Bank and WTO. Resulting estimates are used to extend the OECD STRI approach to 23 additional countries, producing what we term a Services Policy Index (SPI). Converting the SPI to ad valorem equivalent terms shows that services policies are typically much more restrictive than tariffs on imports of goods, in particular in professional services and telecommunications. The SPI has strong explanatory power for bilateral trade in services at the sectoral level, as well as for aggregate goods and services trade.

The paper reviews the disciplines for tackling regulatory divergence in services included in 23 PTAs entered into by China, the EU, Japan, and the USA. It identifies a remarkable expansion in the number and extent of disciplines on regulatory transparency, regulatory coherence, and regulatory cooperation compared with GATS, which, subject to adequate implementation, will allow these agreements to deliver a degree of market integration well beyond what could be achieved simply by removing market access restrictions and discriminatory measures from the rule book. However, the paper calls for some restraint when estimating the potential impact of these disciplines, mainly because of the soft language used for phrasing some of them and the anticipated high implementation costs, particularly for countries with unsophisticated domestic legal systems.

Our analysis focuses on whether future changes in the GATS regulatory framework might eventually provide better outcomes in terms of trade liberalisation. We start our analysis by providing a succinct overview of the GATS framework of rules and principles, focusing in particular on the implementation of that framework so far. Then, we focus on three issues – public services, safeguards and domestic regulation – that may have important implications for the GATS regulatory framework. In doing so, we do not call into question the negotiating agenda as it has been established by negotiators and instead provide an evaluation on its merits. In two cases – safeguards and domestic regulation – the negotiating mandates are well established, while in the third case – public services – although no formal negotiation has been envisaged, the issue as such has the potential to influence negotiating outcomes in key sectors, such as education, health, postal, energy and environmental services.

In our view, the best solution to the ‘public services’ conundrum is not a drastic reduction of the scope of GATS by excluding specific sectors from its provisions. Instead, increased awareness of the stakes involved in the liberalisation of socially sensitive service sectors may help WTO Members shape their commitments in light of their political, social and economic interests in those sectors. In the case of safeguards, after providing an analysis of the main arguments for such a mechanism, we show that the existing framework can adequately take care of concerns arguing in favour of temporary protection. Unlike the negotiations on safeguards, no WTO Member seems to question the desirability of developing further disciplines on domestic regulation as they are understood by the GATS. After analysing the case for horizontal disciplines, we conclude that such a horizontal approach should be complemented without delay with a sectoral approach that could cater for specific regulatory problems not being addressed in the Article VI.4 work programme. In our view, there are good reasons to try to complement the horizontal approach with a sectoral focus that would likely take the form of additional commitments under Article XVIII GATS.