this chapter discusses the outline of the legal regulation of the global economy, focusing on how the system is divided into separate domains (trade, finance, investment, etc) and provides basic overviews of each of these

This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the role reciprocity plays in treaties. First looking at treaty law and how reciprocity functions in the rules on reservations to treaties, the chapter goes on to examine reciprocity’s role in bilateral treaties, drawing on the examples of air transport agreements and energy agreements in particular, before looking at reciprocity’s role in multilateral treaties of the bilateralizable, interdependent, and integral types. It then analyzes treaties creating international organizations, particularly the EU and ILO, and differentiated obligations in environmental and trade law, illustrating how reciprocity operates in these types of instrument. Finally, the chapter addresses "objective regimes" and the effects of treaties on third parties. While some limitations exist on reciprocity, these do not depend on the substance of obligations but rather on the legal equality of the subjects involved.

Concerns about international competitiveness and the associated global institutions and processes of trade are at the heart of resistance to ambitious climate policy. There is tension between the need to be competitive and the significant costs of decarbonisation in the transition to low-carbon economies. The World Trade Organisation and related agreements simultaneously promote contradictory goals: the removal of 'barriers to trade' including 'behind the border' environmental regulation and the need to support 'sustainable development'. A particular example of the problems for action on climate change are Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions whereby corporations have been able to sue governments for damages allegedly incurred through the operation of government environmental regulations. Five actions are suggested: raising awareness of the benefits of decarbonisation, developing 'green finance', pursuing standardisation of low carbon technologies, reforming trade law to encourage low-carbon goods and services and ensuring copherence across international frameworks.

Data flows are at the core of digital trade debates, as they are key to the data-driven economy, while at the same time posing a number of challenges to state sovereignty and the protection of individual rights. While adaptation at the WTO has been slow, states have turned to preferential trade venues to address the new set of issues that the era of big data has posed. The chapter, based on a comprehensive dataset, traces the developments in preferential trade agreements, in particular those of relevance to cross-border data flows. It zooms in on the recent trade deals ofthe CPTPP and the USMCA and provides a detailed analysis of the current state of global digital trade law.

Artificial Intelligence is already powering trade today. It is crossing borders, learning, making decisions, and operating cyber-physical systems. It underlies many of the services that are offered today – from customer service chatbots to customer relations software to business processes. The chapter considers AI regulation from the perspective of international trade law. It argues that foreign AI should be regulated by governments – indeed that AI must be ‘locally responsible’. The chapter refutes arguments that trade law should not apply to AI and shows how the WTO agreements might apply to AI using two hypothetical cases . The analysis reveals how the WTO agreements leave room for governments to insist on locally responsible AI, while at the same time promoting international trade powered by AI.

this chapter discusses the outline of the legal regulation of the global economy, focusing on how the system is divided into separate domains (trade, finance, investment, etc) and provides basic overviews of each of these

After three decades of companionship, investment protection rules and trade agreements are heading for a divorce. Investment chapters have been included in preferential trade and investment agreements (PTIAs) since the late 1980s, but they have recently come under fire. The U.S. administration considers privately enforceable investment protection obligations as an unwanted incentive to offshore American jobs, and the EU Commission seeks to omit them to benefit from the accelerated ratification process reserved for trade agreements that fall under exclusive EU competency. After decades of coexistence, investment protection rules and trade agreements are thus likely to go their separate ways. This chapter empirically evaluates the impact of their thirty-year companionship to assess the implications of their looming split. It finds that investment chapters remain little more than a bilateral investment treaty plugged into a trade agreement. PTIAs and self-standing investment treaties do not vary systematically in investment protection content, and the wider trade agreement context does little to affect the interpretation of investment rules in PTIAs. In spite of their coexistence in the same treaty, there is thus little evidence of cross-fertilization between trade and investment protection rules in PTIAs. This absence of normative convergence suggests that their looming split merely formalizes the continuous normative distinction between trade liberalization and investment protection.

After three decades of companionship, investment protection rules and trade agreements are heading for a divorce. Investment chapters have been included in preferential trade and investment agreements (PTIAs) since the late 1980s, but they have recently come under fire. The U.S. administration considers privately enforceable investment protection obligations as an unwanted incentive to offshore American jobs, and the EU Commission seeks to omit them to benefit from the accelerated ratification process reserved for trade agreements that fall under exclusive EU competency. After decades of coexistence, investment protection rules and trade agreements are thus likely to go their separate ways. This chapter empirically evaluates the impact of their thirty-year companionship to assess the implications of their looming split. It finds that investment chapters remain little more than a bilateral investment treaty plugged into a trade agreement. PTIAs and self-standing investment treaties do not vary systematically in investment protection content, and the wider trade agreement context does little to affect the interpretation of investment rules in PTIAs. In spite of their coexistence in the same treaty, there is thus little evidence of cross-fertilization between trade and investment protection rules in PTIAs. This absence of normative convergence suggests that their looming split merely formalizes the continuous normative distinction between trade liberalization and investment protection.

In this chapter, Section 1 discusses the increasing constitutionalization of human right law (HRL) and international economic law (IEL) at national and regional levels of governance and its implications for the settlement of disputes. Section 2 discusses constitutional justice principles as legal basis for impartial third-party adjudication requiring judicial administration of justice and treaty interpretations in conformity with the principles of justice and human rights. Section 3 elaborates in more detail problems of systemic integration and constitutionalist interpretation in IEL (e.g., resulting from fragmentation and forum shopping) and enhance the legitimacy of law and adjudication. Section 4 gives an overview of procedural human rights dimensions in IEL adjudication, like the human right of access to justice and the emerging common law of transnational adjudication. Section 5 discusses procedural and substantive human rights problems in WTO and investment adjudication. Section 6 criticizes trade and investment adjudication for neglecting human rights law and constitutional, distributive, corrective and commutative justice principles.